Mariners suck at bunting, keep trying
DMZ · November 16, 2005 at 9:58 am · Filed Under Mariners
Todd S. suggested this link to Steve Goldman’s “Pinstriped Bible” blog entry which includes (at bottom) an intersting table on team bunting, and how Hargrove loved the sac bunt even though he didn’t get anything out of it.
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13 Responses to “Mariners suck at bunting, keep trying”
Hooray for giving away outs! And not even getting a base out of it!
I don’t know what’s more painful, thinking about how often they managed to screw up bunting (which seems like trying to burn off a wart using a propane torch…and setting yourself on fire) or thinking about how many more bunt attempts there would have been had the starting pitching not put us so far behind in most games.
What does “SH” stand for? I assume it is something along the lines of “successful sacrifice,” but I can’t figure it out. Also, it looks like Lou was pretty bad at bunting in Tampa as well.
SH = sacrifice hit
Thank goodness for the White Sox, at least there was one team with more sacrifice attempts than the M’s in the AL last year.
Thank goodness for the White Sox, at least there was one team with more sacrifice attempts than the M’s in the AL last year.
I dread hearing the inevitable comments about how this is why the White Sox are a good team…
It really is funny to see the Rangers leading the league in any sort of bunting category.
To complete this little foray into bunting, it should be mentioned how often a sac bunt attempt leads to an error or bunt single for each team. When deciding whether or not it’s a good strategy to bunt, we’re likely underestimating its value if we only consider the worst two outcomes of the bunt–a “successful” sacrifice, and making an out.
I’ve never been against bunting for a base hit (yay baserunners!)- but 99% of the time, that isn’t going to happen in a sac bunt situation, because everyone in the stadium KNOWS you are sacrificing the runner along, and the 3rd baseman or 1st baseman is playing in close enough that you can smell what they had to eat before the game.
The errors and “oops” singles on sac bunts don’t happen enough to counter the negative effects of burning an out, and they DO get calculated in for the sophisticated tools.
Now, is there some utility in getting a fielder in close and swinging away? Maybe- but that means you have to give up on the SH, and you can get that if you have a good bunter who runs fast doing bunts in non-SH situations (like leading off an inning), without the SH downside.
“The errors and “oops†singles on sac bunts don’t happen enough to counter the negative effects of burning an out, and they DO get calculated in for the sophisticated tools.”
They get calculated in, but only on the average. We need to move past analyzing game strategies based on what happens to the average player in an average situation.
For instance, look at the linked table. It is clear, even from the standpoint of entire teams, that different teams have different abilities to execute a sac bunt. Now, if different teams have different ability levels, shouldn’t we assume that amongst players there exists a greater variance in ability?
I’ve seen quite a few analyses of bunting, but I’ve never seen anyone look at it from the standpoint of how the value of the bunt changes if we are considering Barry Bonds bunting to Scott Rolen at third base versus Willie Bloomquist bunting to Edgar Martinez at third base. It’s fine to have a nice general rule and see how things work in general, but I’m convinced that over the course of the season there are situations that arise in which it is advantageous for the manager to put the bunt sign on.
Quick off-the-cuff calculation on errors and “oops” singles:
Ignore, for the moment, the ordinary sacrifices that work as intended. Suppose that the number of times reached on attempted sacrifice is half of the number of failed sacrifices. Then the OBP on non-normal sacrifice results is .333, and the de facto SLG a little higher than that (treating it as a double if the third baseman chucks it down the RF line and the batter gets to second, and so forth). This is comparable to the performance that would be expected from the typical hitter who gets asked to bunt, if you just let him swing away.
Suppose that the bunting success rate is 75% (about the MLB average according to these tables). Then you’d need about 12% of your bunts to allow the batter to reach, to cancel out the 25% of bunts that fail.
I don’t know what the frequency of reaching on a sacrifice is, but I’d guess that it’s probably more like about 5%. So, yes, I agree with Eponymous that this doesn’t counter the negative effects of the outs burned.
Furthermore: The fact that an entire team can be as low as 61%, and that the ML average is as low as 75% or so, should really call into question the idea of bunting as a “fundamental.” The idea of a fundamental is that, if you’re concentrating and trying to do the right thing, then “of course” you’re going to be able to make the play (like hitting the cutoff man on a throw from the outfield). But with bunting, that’s not really the case.
Rather, bunting should be viewed as a skill. It’s not a skill that would be valuable for everybody, mind you; even if Barry Bonds could get it down every time for you, you’d still want him to swing away. But for below-average hitters– hitters weak enough that bunting could be valuable in the right circumstances– the bunt vs. swing decision should properly consider, not only the game situation and the batter’s skills when swinging away, but also the likelihood of a successful execution of the sacrifice. Some guys, presumably, can get it down pretty consistently; but, obviously (from these tables), some can’t.
(Further note, since Mat posted while I had the reply box open: Yes, I agree about considering the specific situation. The early paragraphs of my post deal with averages only; but I hope it’s evident from my last paragraph that I do recognize that the real decisions deal with specific cases.)
All three players at some point hit in the two hole, underscoring the fact that along with “LH sock” this team is in dire need of a quality number two hitter.
I’m convinced that over the course of the season there are situations that arise in which it is advantageous for the manager to put the bunt sign on.
Sure there are. For instance, a SH can minimize your chances of scoring 2 runs (by handing you an out) but maximize a chance of scoring 1 run. If THAT RUN is the one you need to win the game, you bet you put the bunt sign on. Hell, even Earl Weaver’s teams in the 70’s (after the DH showed up) executed occasional sac bunts- and we all know how he disliked them.
But the thing is the average generally describes the scenario for the entire league, and handles the majority of the cases. Are there outlying situations? Sure. But in general, the SH is mostly not helping your team.