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The Cheater's Guide to Baseball
"Derek Zumsteg should be ashamed to have such comprehensive knowledge of the history of cheating in baseball. Pete Rose gave me two to one odds this book would become a classic." -- Allen Barra, author of The Last Coach: A Life of Paul "Bear" Bryant
On bullpen usage
The lengthy post I did on Hargrove’s reliance on roles and how it likely cost the team a game generated a lot of good discussion and some derision that I would even throw out Putz as an option in discussing Hargrove’s options. I disagree that this (or really, any strategy or move) is beyond questioning, and this is an important subject worth our consideration.
Here’s my basic point: modern bullpen usage, with its reliance on one-inning specialists, is a poor use of pitchers.
The role, and the mystique, only began with the invention of the save, and since the save statistic was kept, the role of the closer’s become narrower and narrower, until they’re now largely limited to only pitching the ninth, only if the team’s up 1-3 runs.
This is not how teams managed their pitchers for almost all of baseball history. For a long time, of course, pitchers were expected to go all game, and the pitchers in the bullpen were scraps and cast-offs, often starters who’d lost their endurance as they aged, random kids hoping for a shot.
Then we got the modern relief ace, the stopper, brought in to quench rallies, regularly throwing more than one inning.
In any event, I wanted to throw out some avenues for further reading about optimal bullpen usage, if you’re curious why there’s a huge contingent of really smart people who think the rigid adherence to roles, with 8th inning = setup man, 9th inning = closer, is not the best way to do things.
Baseball Prospectus stuff
“How to Run a Bullpen” (Me)
This is why modern bullpen usage is inefficient. It’s like saving your best pinch-hitter for when you’re behind by three runs, or only starting your best option at shortstop on days when there’s a full moon because that’s when things get crazy. Resources should always be deployed where they can do the most good, and modern closers as blood-lusting Gods of War, along with their Phobos/Deimos setup men (one lefty, one righty), are a bad use of resources.
Includes leverage chart!
“Optimal Bullpen Usage, Continued” (Me)
Research into the value of closers and bullpen usage shows us that the best places to use your best relievers is in close games, especially games that are tied, or where you have a one-run lead. The difference in quality between the first and the third man out of the pen isn’t as great as is generally perceived, so worrying about saving the best pitcher for the highest-leverage inning in a tight game doesn’t make much sense. For all this, though, how to use your best relievers in a game will almost never be quite as clear as choosing a .080 advantage over a .059 advantage in spotting your second-best reliever in the seventh or eighth, because the game situation will never allow you enough future information to use relievers in a way that will appear optimal in retrospect
There’s also a good chapter on this in “Baseball Between the Numbers” (”Are teams letting their closers go to waste?” by Keith Woolner)
Are teams wasting their closers? Not completely, but they aren’t getting as much out of them as they could, and it’s costing them wins. This is one area where the refinement of strategy has actually taken us away from the optimum usage pattern. During the “stopper” era of the 1970s, it was common to see a relief ace such as Rollie Fingers or Goose Gossage come in as early as the sixth inning to halt a nascent rally. That was the smart way to go. Focusing on situational leverage, rather than the accumulation of easy ninth-inning saves, is the best way to get the most out of the relief aces.
It’s a great essay, and I recommend it (and the book).
The Book
The Tango/Lichtman/Dolphin “The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball” has a lot on this. Helpfully, this is excerpted in Sports Illustrated for your enjoyment.
The Hardball Times
Which brings us to another great Tango piece, which goes into leverage and why it’s important to think about it when considering bullpens.
I really liked “The Closer and the Damage Done” (Treder) which examines the evolution of the closer and the modern bullpen.
The Closer model, with its highly specialized distinct bullpen roles, serves a purpose of greatly structuring and simplifying the in-game decision-making process for managers. Once the manager makes the determination of who his Closer is, who his primary Setup man is, who his LOOGYs are, and so on, then the decision of who to summon in various game situations becomes something close to following the recipe in a cookbook: when this happens, do that; once that’s happened, do this. Pre-1979 Bruce Sutter might be brought in during a crucial spot in the 7th inning - a tricky tradeoff decision for his manager to weigh - but a manager following the Closer model faces no such challenge. No matter what, if it’s the 7th inning, your Closer sits. One less thing to have to think about.
It’s a great read. Treder also wrote on the evolution of the lefty specialist in “A History of the LOOGY”: Part One and Part Two
Those should form an excellent introduction to the topic, but please, if you think there are pieces that should be added, drop them in the comments.
All of that raises the question of “why don’t teams do this, if it’s a better way?” Treder addresses this a little, but there are several reasons:
- it’s how it’s done (institutional inertia)
- it’s the easy way to go (risk/reward for managers favors running the bullpen this way)
- it’s what players expect (fit to role, financial rewards for performing to role)
You do see teams apply some of the lessons of baseball research, but usually they only go whole hog if they’re desperate. Generally, where you see this used is on the margins: a manager will annoit someone the closer, someone else the setup man, picking veterans, and then will use their stud youngsters in the role that used to be the “stopper”.
However, the prominent failure of “bullpen by committee” experiments (and the loud, public criticism that came with those failures) makes teams even more risk-averse. Even the A’s, who generally speaking will go out on the weakest limb to test these things, and who for some time enjoyed turning out “proven closers” and then trading them while their value was inflated, gave in and now only play with roles on the margins.
When we saw the White Sox go without a traditional closer and managed the bullpen by the game demands and matchups, they called it “closer by situation” and it worked just fine.
That something exists, and the establishment believes it’s the way things have to be, doesn’t mean that it has always been so, or that it’s the best way to do things. I hope these articles will help show how we got here, and how teams can get more from their relief pitchers.
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I wonder what the “closer model” says about using your top starting pitching prospect one a week as a mop-up guy and burning up his MLB service time in the process?
Notwithstanding the Morrow Disaster sarcasm, I completely agree with the theory and analysis DMZ. Becuase of the closer model, Putz has become the least valuable elite reliver in the game so far this year.
I’d like to keep this post on the subject in general, and not the specifics of the M’s not doing it well, since we’ve discussed those instances elsewhere.
Ok, sorry. I thought that tonight’s game pointed out how insignificant the “save” really can be with K-Rod getting one in this game.
He didn’t get a save.
I’m pretty sure he did. Tying run on deck right?
Wow, and there it is in the box score, S, 5 next to his name. I just looked at the scoreboard and it’s only got W/L.
So, yes: the save’s a bad stat anyway.
That’s all I was saying. Further proof of what you are suggesting. That bad stat drives game decisions.
I would argue that tonight was a display of proper use of a bullpen. F-Rod wasn’t even warming up until the psuedo-rally, and if Carrasco had been able to get even one more out F-Rod wouldn’t have needed to pitch because the game would likely have been totally out of reach. Darren Oliver was ready.
One of the things that I like about Torre’s use of Rivera and using the wayback machine, Baker’s use of Beck, is that those closers come in the eighth. Although Baker would never bring Beck in the 8th in a tie game, which frustrated me.
The thing that irks me most about the save statistic is that it’s entirely arbitrary and it really doesn’t represent anything of actual value to the game. It’s awarded on the basis of not screwing up.
It’ll never go away now because I’m sure it’s too much of a factor in contract negotiations and ESPN broadcasts, but it’s still a silly stat.
The analysis was intuitively correct, backed by data and easily passing the common sense test. Treating closers as sacred is really just fashion.
Quoting from the linked article:
#9: While tonight’s game may in fact have been a rational use of the bullpen, it highlights the way that managers look at saves to make decisions. Had LA been up by 4 with 2 or 3 on in the 7th, I can 100% guarantee you that K-Rod would not have been in the game, even though that moment would have represented the M’s best chance to change the outcome of the game. This is only because the designated “closer” would not be in a “save situation.” Just because LA backed into a classic closer-type situation in the 9th doesn’t mean that it is the correct use of a bullpen.
If LA ever does put K-Rod into a game with a 3 or 4 run lead and the bases juiced in the 7th, I will be proven wrong about managers being save/stat motivated.
Well, I can see some value in that, when Grover’s the one who would be doing the thinking. I shudder to contemplate what he might do if he didn’t have a book to go by. Put Ibanez on the mound to hold a 1 run lead in the sixth, because Ibanez is a tough veteran? Or maybe bring in Johjima to pitch since he made the last out last inning and would have a chance to rest up before his next AB.
Kidding aside, it’s a bit comical how people start generating wacky supporting evidence when a fad - like the closer role - come along. Look how much noise gets made about the unique mental makeup required to “get the last three outs.” Nobody talked that way before the closer role came along, but now it get’s justified by some ooga-booga that says facing Izturis, Napoli and Aybar with the bases empty in the ninth is more nerve-wracking than facing Vlad in the seventh with a one run lead and the bases juiced.
I would also argue that when you have an elite closer but your team can’t ever get to him, it’s time to trade him for a starter or some bats. Because that is how a team without a reliable bullpen can actually win games.
14:
I agree.
I agree with your criticism of modern bullpen use. So do some others, including Whitey Herzog. The 7th, 8th, and 9th batters may be coming up in the 9th, and you’re going to use your best reliever on them?
When will this nonsense end? Whitey Herzog put it well in YOU’RE MISSING A GREAT GAME when he said (and I paraphrase): ‘It will end when some manager says to his closer, “I don’t give a damn about your stats; I know it’s only the 6th inning, but there’s a fire out there; I need this game, so get out there, and put that fire out.”‘
When we saw the White Sox go without a traditional closer and managed the bullpen by the game demands and matchups, they called it “closer by situation” and it worked just fine.
I think that shows you need a “baseball man” who is good at manipulating the media to implement the strategy without much public outcry. When Ozzie does stuff like that, the media doesn’t really question him, because they know he’s seen a lot of games, etc., etc. If the Red Sox try it, it’s crazy Bill James and Theo Epstein trying to push their “new-fangled” stats on baseball, and what would they know–they haven’t ever played The Game.
And if the bullpen wasn’t pitching all that well, Ozzie would find a way to nickname some group of hitters on the opposing team, or say something ridiculous to deflect attention from the pitchers who were struggling. He’s pretty good at stuff like that.
That’s a great point. The manager, whoever it is, would need to be able to fight it on two fronts: to convince his staff to accept it, and then to keep the media off them so a normal failure isn’t treated like the collapse of the team’s chances.
In a way, that’s similar to the barrier a four-man rotation faces: it may make more sense. The five-man rotation may, as Bill James said, be an evolutionary dead-end. But unless you can get your guys to sign on and commit, you won’t succeed.
To avoid any criticism, would an astute manager quietly just slide a ‘fake-closer’ in the traditional 9th inning role? A veteran reliever who isn’t the best arm in the pen, but still solid and comfortable in the role? This allows a manager some freedom to put their actual best reliever into a much more flexible role, using him when the game calls for it most. Thus making the ’set-up’ man the true ‘ace of the pen’.
That sure seems like what Leyland is doing in Detroit, for example.
#19
That would make a lot of sense from the team’s point of view, but I think it is hard for the players to accept it under the current system. Since “Closers” are valued higher than “Set up men”, If I were the best reliever on the team I would much rather close games, rack up saves, and increase my market value rather than let somebody else close. (if I were given the choice) Obviously teams/scouts do not value relieves solely by their roles and how many saves they have, but it is an obvious trend that teams pay much more for proven closers than for proven set-up men.
#19 and #20: The Braves are doing it, too. Wickman’s the cagey old veteran closer, with Soriano and Gonzalez the “setup men” (who probably have better stuff than Wickman).
If you have several very good relievers, it can be a moot point. The 2006 Mariners, at one point, had Soriano and Lowe to bridge the gap to Putz. Doesn’t matter how you deploy those three, it’s going to work out.
19: It’s been said that that’s what the 2001 Mariners effectively did with Rhodes and Sasaki. I wish B-R.com had leverage stats for that year, it’d be interesting to see if Rhodes really did end up with more LI than Sasaki.
The funny thing is if we didn’t have Julio Mateo to even tempt Mike Hargrove, and if Mike Hargrove wasn’t such an idiot in the first place, we wouldn’t be having this discussion right now. . .
Let’s face it.
I really like the idea. But I think the manager has one more important task — knowing when to put in the best reliever for the situation. I can imagine a manager like hargrove would either put in the best reliever in a situation that may not be the highest leverage, or conversely, save his best relievers for fear of a more high-leverage situation later on. So the manager really needs to know his staff and situation leverages for this to work, otherwise the situation would be similar to the traditional relief roles today.
well, fwiw, Putz agrees with you.
#20…you’re spot on! This is a problem that was created by “heard mentality” managers…but the problem has grown into its current unchangeable situation because of players and the players union. Being the “closer” has to be one of the easiest roles on the team (this tough-guy, nerves of steel. You always know when you’ll be called on (9th inning); 8 times out of 10 you’ll come in to start the inning with 0-on 0-outs; pitch from the wind-up; you pitch just one inning, 3 or 4 hitters. Hitter’s mentality is simple. If the batter is a HR hitter, they’re trying to put one out…if not, they’ll be taking a strike. As a closer, you only need two pitches to do the job. Do your job and you get the Save glamour and the money.
Compare that to the set-up man who comes in to clean up the mess of another pitcher. Runners on base; tough out at the plate; high stress situation. You get no glamour and are paid less for doing a tougher job. Why would ANY pitcher want to do this over being “The Closer”?
Sorry…something got lost in my previous post…
(this tough-guy, nerves of steel, mental makeup personna is a fraud perpetrated on the public by “closers” themselves. Is a closer’s makeup any different than any other reliever’s?).
I would also add that if you’re able to pitch well in the first inning, or the 6th-8th inning, you’ll be able to pitch well in the 9th inning as a closer. If you can’t pitch in those innings…you probably should be in AAA or out of baseball.
and
I think these two observations will be the biggest force for continuing the closer trend. But as Derek said in the post, it’s all a result of the Save stat, so maybe the solution is to change the stat.
Since the Save stat is geared towards getting the last few outs in anything other than a blowout situation, it’s what generates the “last three outs are the toughest” mentatlity that creates the closer role. So change the criteria, and use some of that new-fangled “stats” stuff. How about awarding a save to any pitcher who enters a game with the lead and generates a positive Win Expectancy. Or maybe a Win Expectancy of at least +2% (or some such number). There’s really no need for only one guy to get a Save (and we could dispense with the execrable Hold stat).
Okay, okay, so that screws up the record books. Fine, keep the Save stat as it is, but introduce a new stat. Ladies and Gentlemen, introducing the “Stop”: awarded to any pitcher who enters a close game (LI > 1.0 upon entry) and records at least one inning of positive Win Expectancy.
If the Stop was adopted (and became the criteria teams used to set reliever salaries) then it would encourage using the best relievers in high leverage situations, and discourage LOOGY/ROOGY use too (can’t get a Stop for facing one batter).
This isn’t that complicated. You want to have your best reliever - your closer - available every day. That is why you save him for the 9th. With that being said, I agree with the Torre approach of bringing in Rivera to get an out or two in the 8th.
Yes it is, and no you don’t. Even “saving him for the ninth” doesn’t make them available every day, and it doesn’t make pitching the ninth more valuable.
w/r/t to the “fake closer” - that’s actually in the post there.
I think if I was a baseball manager I would name my second best reliever “closer” and use my best reliever to put out fires. Ironically, I think this is what the 2006 Mariners were planning on doing with Putz/Soriano, but then Putz became amazing and changed the strategy. Still, their behavior since makes it appear that now they’ve got their ace closer figured out, the rest is more expendable, so I’m a little confused. Hopefully Lowe can come back and make it a little less of a disaster.
If I had three options, I might go like Atlanta this year or Detroit (though Jones scares me…the ninth might not be all-important, but it’s still pretty important, and I might want a better reliever than him handling it). But it is tough to tell your best reliever or two that they’re not going to be able to get the big contracts because they’re not racking up saves. It might cause clubhouse problems too, which though also overemphasized, could be pretty unpleasant. And it just doesn’t seem quite fair.
The big question for me is whether Hargrove would be a better or worse in-game manager without established rules. Well, he’d probably just make up his own, but it does seem like he might actually be better off without them, despite his difficulties strategically speaking. I mean, bringing in Putz to stop fires and Mateo for after that sometime sounds pretty good to me, though who knows if that’s what he would actually do.
#31
Oh, I’m sorry. You’re right and everyone who actually gets paid to manage a baseball team is wrong. My mistake. I am new here.
The 9th is unique. Managers pull out all the stops with pinch hitters. Batters bear down more. The closer model makes perfect sense to me - and to the majority of baseball professionals.
I am looking forward to all the hysterical criticism on the day Putz is unavailable to pitch the 9th when we have one run lead because he was used earlier in the game, or pitched two or three innings the night before.
34, it’s not that you don’t have a point, but a lot of us really are committed to a different philosophy. I think there are multiple ways that can work well…Rivera and the Yankees have a great thing going with a *fairly* traditional closer model.
But we’ll take our lumps if Putz is ever used early and unavailable for the ninth. We know we may lose some of those games. We believe we would lose less if we used him in the highest leverage situations. Many times, that may be the ninth, but not every night.
Also, AuburnM, you’re misreading DMZ’s point a bit. What he means is:
1) Yes it is that complicated.
2) There are times when using your closer exclusively for the ninth still results in him being unavailable, whether from exhaustion from over time games or whatever, and more importantly…
3) Games like Thursday’s, where he pitches when we’re so far behind that it doesn’t matter anymore.
No one is arguing that the best reliever should always be used before the ninth or anything crazy like that.
Granted, we would probably be having a very different conversation about this if Hargrove could use the rest of his non-closer bullpen efficiently. There are ways to succeed with a traditional closer bullpen, chiefly by building a good bullpen overall instead of putting all your eggs in basket. One way or another, you definitely want to have a good pitcher in the 9th during close-ish games.
But one thing I think I know for sure, is that when you’re holding onto a one-run lead against Johan frickin’ Santana in the 7th, that’s the most important point of the game. We have other relievers who can handle the situation later pretty well. But Putz would have given us the best chance to win *that* game. It wouldn’t have been the only way, I thought these guys outlined some other good strategies. But it would have been the most likely thing to result in a win.
Well-put.
I’ll add this: the ninth is not different. If hitters could become better by “bearing down more” they’d do it more often. Pinch-hitting does not, on the whole, result in a higher quality of hitter than you would face in the rally-quenching situation.
The myth that the ninth is different emerged to justify the modern closer and the modern save. For all of baseball’s history, when pinch-hitters and those strategies were more prominent, the ninth was just another inning, as it should be.
Really - read the links. See what we’re talking about. When to use a reliever is a complicated and interesting question. It’s not as simple as “everyday in the ninth”.
For the record:
I support the Yankee model. Let Putz get four or five outs sometimes, not just three. But no more than that.
I think it is self-evident that the 9th is different than the other 8 innings. It’s the last chance and teams and hitters act accordingly.
I am no Hargrove fan and I agree that his moves and non-moves are often maddening.
I hope this is a place where people can civilly agree to disagree.
It’s not self-evident that the 9th is different, otherwise everyone who studied it wouldn’t disagree with you, and everyone who ran a pitching staff up to the invention and spread of the modern one-inning closer wouldn’t have run their staffs that way.
It’s not. It’s a myth. There’s no evidence that that’s true. Hitters don’t hit better in the ninth even adjusting for the increased recent use of better relievers in that inning. They don’t. Doesn’t happen.
If you accept, for a moment, that batters actually can “bear down more…”
Why wouldn’t they do it in a 7th inning situation in a one-run game with two men on base (as an instance of a higher leverage situation that we’re talking about as an alternative to a ’save’ situation) rather than with no one on, no outs, in the bottom of the 9th (a fairly typical ’save’ situation)?
The batter would clearly be able to see that he’s got a better chance to impact the game in the former situation rather than the latter, so he’d “bear down” then just as much, if not more so, than the hypothetical 9th inning situation.
I hope this is a place where people can civilly agree to disagree.
It’s also a place where people can learn. If you take a more open minded view of what you think you know, you might be amazed at what you’ll discover.
Which is why I think you should look more closely at the situations and statistics. What is “self-evident” actually often is not, after taking another look at it.
But if we grant that the 9th inning is “different”, why doesn’t it work the other way? That the 9th inning, the hitters are more desperate, they’re taking more chances, and they’re EASIER to get out?
That said…team psychology and people management is important. It’s fine and dandy to say that using your best reliever in the worst situation is your strategy, but selling it to your players is also important; players implementing a strategy they have no confidence in will probably not be that successful.
Yes. See comments 16-17.
I don’t think that the “closer mentality”, unfortunately, is ever going to go away until two things happen:
1) ESPN stops lionizing closers (Mariano Rivera’s eventual retirement will help with this somewhat, but others will take his place)
2) The save stat stops being part of contract negotiations.
In other words, it’s here to stay.
To be honest, I often disagree with the rationale of the “statistical perspective” provided by the gentlemen here at the USSM. However, I’m also willing to provide that the new statistics provided in the last several years are groundbreaking in the way they allow for a change of perspective in how to best analyze a game and maximize your opportunities for success.
I have been paid to coach/manage baseball teams, albeit for a small HS stipend. And much of what the USSM espouses is not applicable in that environment, we simply can’t apply accurate statistics to the level done in MLB.
Still, to not look at the possibilities is incredibly counter-intuitive to winning. While coaching, I will find whatever means necessary to best put my team into a position to win. And hardlined roles and definitions limit the decision-maker.
And who defines what is and isn’t the definition of what should be hardline roles? While you should listen to those that came before, you should also create your own judgement. Hargrove, like most managers, has not.
We are in a Renaissance Era of statistical analysis. And while I often find myself in the old school in regards to my approach to the game, acting on gut-instincts and hunches, I do so while also taking the statistical potentials into account.
To not acknowledge the significance of evolutionary thinking is to put yourself in a position of weakness and growing insignicance. You are hastening your own coaching extinction if you don’t alter your thinking to best maximize you team’s chance to win.
I was lucky to have some strong teams, and I often put my weakest pitchers in to start the game and go “as deep as they can.” Once they got into trouble, I’d replace them with my upper tier guys, in high leverage situations. Most likely in the 3rd or 4th inning, ideally in the 5th, 6th or 7th (hs=7 inning games.)
There were no salaries involved. Statistics were irrelevant, in regards to Saves– nobody cared. I didn’t even keep the stat. We knew who was stronger, who was weaker, who pitched well, who didn’t. And most importantly, we knew that a TEAM WIN was a team effort and was the one statistic that mattered.
You can take your 9th inning significance. Ballgames are made the other 8 innings, and winning is done when you put your best players in a position of significance when the game is on the line– ALL GAME LONG!
Well put, and that’s really the essence of it. To me, that seems intuitive, and statistical methods support your statement.
In this case, though, Hargrove really did create his own judgment. The only reason for bringing Mateo in there was Hargrove’s gut, as far as I can see.
The only other possibility mentioned was that Mateo had success against Cuddyer, so playing the specific matchup made sense (let’s ignore the statistical insignificance of such an assumption for a moment). But even that makes no sense — Mateo vs. Cuddyer in ‘06 resulted in a sacrifice fly (ahem, FLY) and a single.
Maybe Hargrove thought he was “due” … heh.
Let’s put it a little different way (and sorry this may not exactly fit but it’s close enough to lend some understanding). If you’re in the World Series and are down 3 games to 2 with game 6 and 7 looming AND you have your staff ace available and your #5 pitcher. Which do you start in game 6 and why? Everyone will tell you to pitch the ACE in game 6 because you may never make it to game 7.
I think this is relational to today’s conversation. You pitch your best available or your ACE may never get a chance and there may never be a game 7. What others are trying to say here is that if you’re in a critical juncture in later in the game (7th or 8th), why wouldn’t you bring in your best reliever to put down a rally? If you don’t, you may never get a chance to use your best pitcher.
If the 9th were unique for hitters and thus, they’re somehow better in the 9th…and if I were the manager…I would instruct all of my hitters to approach EVERY inning as the 9th inning! I would have the best team in the league!
Saving a pitcher for the 9th makes him LESS available than if you used him when the situation warranted. If I have the flexibility to bring in my “closer” whenever the game was at a critical juncture, that gives me the ability to bring him in at any moment from the 7th inning on. This doesn’t mean you’re going to pitch him for 3 innings and burn him out for 3 days. You may only have him pitch 3-4-5 outs and then bring in someone else. That ways he’s still available the following day if needed.
If you save a “closer” for the 9th only, you may not ever need him because the game is out of reach or the team is behind.
I don’t think the closer tag is here to stay. Rivera retiring will help, since there don’t seem to be as many “name brand” closers.
IMHO, what will change this is when closers become the generally accepted “best relief pitcher” (many times the case now), and thus a “rally killer.” This will end up replacing the closer and the save concept. Think “men left on base” (from a previous pitcher.)
In addition to the Braves and Tigers, I’d like to throw the Padres into the mix. Cla Meredith may be the best non-Jake-Peavy pitcher they have. Also, what about the Indians?
Check it,
This from a Bill Simmons chat session:
Could this be the example of giving the “closer” job to a veteran just to have a name attached, but then using your relief ace (Zumaya) as your real stopper…hmm….
I honestly think Hargrove doesn’t know the groundball/flyball numbers for his relievers — or he knows but he just doesn’t believe they’re meaningful, because he thinks a pitcher can induce a groundball in a given situation just by trying. I mean, we have that quote from last year where he said he brought Mateo in to get a groundball, when Mateo was the least likely pitcher in all of baseball to achieve that. Now, it could be he thinks the GB/FB stats are bunk and reflect random variation when the pitcher isn’t “trying” one way or the other… but if that’s the case, then he shouldn’t be looking at matchups either because the same reasoning applies (especially since the sample size on matchups is smaller). Honestly, I don’t know what (if anything) he’s thinking, and I’m sick of trying.
Yeah, this kills me. Theoretically you could have a guy come in every game with three men on, give up an XBH so all three score, then get the remaining out(s) — and he could do this every game, all season, losing game after game, and still end up with an ERA of 0.00. Yeah, I know ERA is bogus as a predictive stat but here it completely blows as a performance measurement altogether. Sure, there are other stats that would capture what Mateo-esque suckitude this represents, but still — what number factors into contract talks and fan conversation (and the thinking of managers like Hargrove)?
Getting back to the original discussion, I will note that if you look at the Fangraphs leaderboard and sort by pLI, the top of the list is heavily dominated by “closers.” Which — I think — suggests they generally are being used correctly, even if it’s by accident. (In this regard it’s interesting to compare Jones and Zumaya: though Jones has a higher ERA, he is also higher in pLI and WPA). And what Mariner reliever has the most negative WPA? (The astonishing thing is that he’s only the 13th worst).
Thanks for the links!
I also recommend the Fangraphs leaderboards for LI, as noted in the above comment. In The Book, I showed how the LI for the closer should be in the 2.1 to 2.3 range, not the 1.7-1.9 that is the norm. Percival was the only one used close to optimal in 99-02. (Of course, just looking at a few games in 2007 won’t be enough.) The basic thing is to stop the 3+ run lead appearances in the 9th, and introduce 8th inning situations. If we’re looking for LI situations of 2.0 or higher, then there are plenty of situations where the LI is 3.0 and above for your ace to come into:
http://www.insidethebook.com/li.shtml#16
As well, Mike’s Baseball Rants had a great series on reliever usage. I’ll look for it tonight, but you can try finding it on baseballtoaster.com .
Yeah, it’s early in the season and when you look at who is sitting at 3rd worst WPA on that list, you know you’re dealing with Small Sample Theater. But looking at past years, there’s a fair smattering of “closers” high on the leverage list… and in fact, there’s a pretty strong correlation between that and teams that are perceived to be well-managed in general.
The trouble with using a stat like this is that it’s way too computation-intensive for any manager sitting in a dugout. Until we reach an era when there’s a guy with a laptop sitting next to him (or whispering into his headset), LI just isn’t going to be used in real time in a game situation. However, even as casual fans we instinctively recognize high leverage situations, and they should be obvious to a good/experienced manager even without supporting calculations. In fact, you could argue that LI is a way for those of us with less experience to arrive at the same conclusion that any “smart old baseball guy” gets from his gut. So when we see a manager apparently oblivious to these situations, or reacting to them inappropriately, we can conclude his gut, however large it may be, is failing him. When he does this repeatedly, we can conclude he’s incapable of managing a pitching staff effectively in game situations. We might even be able to come up with a numerical ranking of managers according to how well they use relievers in high leverage situations. And I think we all know who would be dwelling near the bottom of such a list.
I think it would take about 5 minutes to learn the redzones by heart, or heck, put them up in the bullpen. Get the darn relievers excited about how important they are treated.
They are no different to learn than NFL coaches looking at their charts as to when to go for 1 or 2 points.
The tougher part is the warmup. It takes 2-3 batters to warm up, so you can be in a blue zone, the ace warms up, it’s now a redzone, and by the time he is ready, it’s a no-leverage situation.
What would be nice to know is how often Goose and Rollie were warmed up in the 7th/8th innings, only to never enter the game. Those games are not “on the books”, but the 9th inning 4-run lead that Rivera enters are accounted for.
Mike’s history of relief can be found in his archives:
http://mikesrants.baseballtoaster.com/archives/2004_02.html
http://mikesrants.baseballtoaster.com/archives/2004_01.html
(and probably earlier).
Unfortunately, all his links are broken. He used to blog at all-baseball.com, and now blogs at baseballtoaster.com . His URLs did not remap.
It’s a great series if you want to take the time to read them (and if someone wants to post the actually URLs).