Wrap Up, Part One
Well, 2007 is finally in the books. The Mariners finish the year 88-74 despite being outscored by 19 runs on the year, and, of course, we like to break things down, and occassionally, we’ve been known to use some numbers.
We’ll have more post-season analysis in the days to follow, but for now, here’s a quick look at the rankings of the offensive players in terms of runs added above average. This is not position adjusted – we’re simply look at how much value each player added as an offensive player, accumulating runs through hitting and baserunning, compard to a league average hitter. This is based on linear weights, which essentially gives each play an average run value, then sums them up the total individual contributions.
Ichiro: +24 runs
Ibanez: +19 runs
Guillen +16 runs
Vidro: +12 runs
Beltre: +10 runs
Johjima: +1 run
Betancourt: -5 runs
Sexson: -9 runs
Lopez: -22 runs
No big surprises here – Ichiro’s the best hitter on a team of above average hitters, Lopez had a disaster of a season at the plate, and Sexson was terrible as well.
Now, just for fun, let’s do some positional adjustments. Generally, statistical analysis will do position adjustments based on the average performance of hitters at that position, but the more I’ve looked at this, the less I think that’s the right way to do it. Let’s use 2007 National League middle infielders as an example, for instance.
Average NL SS: .279/.337/.420
Average NL 2B: .272/.341/.418
Second baseman and shortstops in the National League put up basically the same line this year. A normal positional adjustment would compare Dan Uggla and Hanley Ramirez to the same baseline. But think about this for a second – does that make any sense at all? We know that almost every shortstop on the planet is capable of playing a quality second base, but very few second baseman can play a credible major league shortstop. Just by the fact that they’ve been deemed able to play shortstop in the major leagues, the SS group is showing a demonstrable skill that the 2B group is not. That has real value, and comparing a batting line to the average of his peers will miss that.
So, instead, I’ve come around to the idea that we should do a position adjustment based on the defensive spectrum. We know that shortstop is harder to play than second base and center field is harder to play than left field, and there’s no reason to expect the relative difficulty of those positions to change on a year-to-year basis, so we can use fixed values to determine the positional adjustments. Tango’s done most of the legwork, and if you’re really interested in the nuts and bolts, I’d recommend checking out his blog, but here’s the overview for the rest of us:
C: +10 runs
SS/CF: +5 runs
2B/3B: +0 runs
LF/RF: -5 runs
1B: -10 runs
DH: -15 runs
This fits pretty well with what we understand about the game. Catcher’s an island unto itself, but the premium defenders play the tougher up the middle positions, the bad defenders get hid at designated hitter or first base, and some of them sneak into corner outfield spots, and the in between guys end up at second or third base. So, applying the defensive spectrum to a positional adjustments, we get the following values for the Mariners’ starting position players.
Ichiro: +29 runs
Ibanez: +14 runs
Guillen: +11 runs
Johjima: +11 runs
Beltre: +10 runs
Betancourt: +0 runs
Vidro: -3 runs
Sexson: -19 runs
Lopez: -22 runs
This gives us a pretty accurate description of how valuable the Mariners line-up was offensively. Ichiro’s the shining star, with Ibanez/Guillen/Johjima/Beltre all being about the same, Betancourt and Vidro hanging around average, and Sexson and Lopez killing rallies every day.
So, there you go – there’s the rankings of the position players as offensive contributors. Tomorrow, we’ll look at the defensive contributions and sum up the position players value in total. And yes, defense changes things. A lot.
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Derek and Dave,
Thanks for all your hard work this year; it improved my understanding of what I was seeing on the field. Appreciate everything you guys do. Let’s hope BB has a better off season than he did last year and look forward to an improved rotation in ‘08 (just don’t ask me how it gets accomplished).
1- Don’t ask Bavasi either. I can only imagine what crap he is going to dig up this year.
Great post, I hope to have an occasional read throughout the winter. As for now I am hoping on the Rockies bandwagon since they are my home team. I hope Peavy gets rocked tonight at the game!
I’m leaving for work so don’t have time right now to search for the answer on Tango’s blog but I don’t understand how defensive adjustments drops the DH by -15 runs when the DH doesn’t play defense.
speaking of wrapping up the season, the young bullpen says, “who’s Little Pony??”
#3- It’s an offensive adjustment. Each position has a certain level of expected offensive output. You expect more offense from your DH than say, your SS. Dig?
I don’t understand how defensive adjustments drops the DH by -15 runs when the DH doesn’t play defense.
It’s not a defensive adjustment – it’s a positional adjustment. By definition, every single position player could be a DH, since it requires no defensive skill. So, 100% of the player pool can be designated hitter, and therefore, it absolutely has to have the heaviest position adjustment of them all.
Basically, this is an offensive handicap. We’re saying that, in any given year, a league average DH should produce 15 more runs offensively than a league average second baseman. Considering the available player pools, that’s a realistic assessment.
I found Tango’s post where he works out the values for these positional adjustments. I don’t see anything there for DH, though. Is there a rationale for that particular value, or is it basically a guess? It sort of throws off the nice symmetry the chart had before. I understand why the DH needs to be at the bottom, but the effect would also make every AL team a net negative defensively.
Or perhaps “net negative defensively” is not the right way to say it – I understand this is not a measurement of defense, but an adjustment for difficulty thereof. Still, it disrupts the scale balanced around zero and opens questions about how useful this can be when comparing AL to NL.
If you’re going to knock a DH for something they aren’t supposed to do,then let’s rate our pitchers on how well they hit too. Felix can’t hit for power or average, so he’s -24 runs.
So these numbers factor in ballpark? For instance that Ibanez is a lefty hitting in a park that’s great for LH hitters? I don’t see Ibanez having a better year than Beltre if this year’s games were in a neutral park instead of Safeco.
Maybe I’m just not tracking something here, but I never have understood why CF is given such a strong adjustment — I’m not saying that’s wrong, just that I don’t get it. Granted the importance of the position, it still seems to me that, if we’re looking at the talent pool, there are more guys out there who can play CF than there are who can play 2B. Players get moved to CF because they can’t handle the keystone, not vice-versa. Given that, it doesn’t make sense to me that the positional adjustment should be greater for CF when there are more of them out there.
cgmonk: if most pitchers had to hit and some didn’t, that would be relevant. Since that isn’t the case, it isn’t.
If you’re going to knock a DH for something they aren’t supposed to do,then let’s rate our pitchers on how well they hit too. Felix can’t hit for power or average, so he’s -24 runs.
Position players are supposed to field. The fact that DH’s aren’t able to makes them less valuable. But thanks for playing.
So these numbers factor in ballpark? For instance that Ibanez is a lefty hitting in a park that’s great for LH hitters? I don’t see Ibanez having a better year than Beltre if this year’s games were in a neutral park instead of Safeco.
The numbers use a blanket park factor, as we’re evaluating value, not true talent level. You have to keep the differences in mind. Since the Mariners don’t play in a neutral park, left-handed hitters are more valuable to the team winning and losing games than right-handed hitters. We can’t ignore this fact when discussing how players did in the past tense.
If we were projecting how Ibanez/Beltre would do on another team, or if the M’s adjusted the fences, then a true talent level analysis would be appropriate.
Granted the importance of the position, it still seems to me that, if we’re looking at the talent pool, there are more guys out there who can play CF than there are who can play 2B.
It might seem that way, but it’s not true.
get moved to CF because they can’t handle the keystone, not vice-versa.
Actually, it’s pretty rare to see a 2B shift to CF. B.J. Upton is an example from this year, but keep in mind that he’d already been tried and failed at SS and 3B. Upton wasn’t moved to CF from 2B until after it was decided that he just didn’t belong on the infield anymore.
Usually, a second baseman who can’t handle the position will be shifted to 3rd or a corner outfield spot, not center field.
Given these numbers above, how much priority should be given to addressing the Lopez at 2b be?
All things considered; including age, potential, SALARY, defense ability, availability of replacements, etc. I was always under the assumption that Starting Pitching was a big #1, followed by the 1B/DH/LF logjam was #2, and at a distant third was the Lopez issue. But it appears that 2nd may be a bigger issue than i thought?
Adjusting the defensive difficulty to properly assess overall run contribution makes sense on a global level, but might fail on an individual level.
Randy Winn was not a great center fielder, but is probably an above average left fielder – he’s the same hitter in either case. But this analysis would suggest that he’s worth 10 runs more when he played center than left…when in fact I would argue the opposite, that he was more of a liablity at center, costing the team runs.
If we were projecting how Ibanez/Beltre would do on another team, or if the M’s adjusted the fences, then a true talent level analysis would be appropriate.
Thanks for the clarification on the post – being on value and not true talent. Makes me wonder how much Safeco actually hurts and helps certain types of hitter.
Along those same lines…Adam Jones! He just doesn’t seem like the type of RH hitter that Safeco will kill – we’ve seen consistent power to the opposite field from him already.
Since the Mariners don’t play in a neutral park, left-handed hitters are more valuable to the team winning and losing games than right-handed hitters.
I don’t really understand why this would be true. Any lineup has to have somewhere close to an even split between RH and LH bats, right? I would think intuitively that it would place extremely high value on elite RH hitters or RH hitters who can use all fields.
I think I’ve seen the argument that the current dimensions end up affecting RH pull hitters and make them less effective even than you would expect given only the dimensions, I would assume that the inverse is true to some extent and that the difference between an elite RHB and a marginal RHB is greater than the difference between a marginal & elite LHB.
What am I missing?
Randy Winn was not a great center fielder, but is probably an above average left fielder – he’s the same hitter in either case. But this analysis would suggest that he’s worth 10 runs more when he played center than left…when in fact I would argue the opposite, that he was more of a liablity at center, costing the team runs.
His offensive contribuition would be more valuable in center, but that would possibly be outweighed by the difference in his defensive value in center as opposed to left. This is only looking at offense.
Re: Winn, re-read the last paragraph of the post.
Today = Offensive contributions only
Tomorrow = Defensive contributions and total value
Loki: this doesn’t take into actual quality of defense – it’s just a positional adjustment. It’s like VORP, but based on the defensive spectrum rather than actual position played. Dave says he’ll talk about defense… tomorrow.
Dave: why on earth don’t all adjusted systems use this type of system? It seems so obvious that this is the way to go, it’s odd that VORP, for example, hasn’t been revised in that direction.
M’s front office: if you need to figure one thing out over the offseason, it’s how a player’s position on the defensive spectrum affects his actual value. Please figure it out. Just because Vidro was an above average hitter doesn’t mean he was an above average player. Seriously. Figure it out.
19 – David H
So we adjust a player’s offensive contribution based on the difficulty of the defensive position, and then separately assess defensive skills to get an overall run contribution? It seems like defense is being counted twice, but perhaps not.
In the case of Randy Winn, perhaps neutralizing the effect, + 5 runs for playing CF on an offensive scale, and then
-5 runs (I made that figure up as an example)as a defensive contribution because he wasn’t that great there. But at LF he might get a +5 runs defensively (against -5 offensively) – effectively arriving at the same Runs contributed Offense + Defense.
21: The FO needs to focus not only his position, but also the type of hitter he is.
Players like Ichiro and Ibanez’s offense is work more in Safeco than most other parks. In other words, the team would get good production for their dollar if they were able to pick up players who Safeco would help (like Ibanez), or just not hurt (like Ichiro).
CCW – Do you mean that VORP doesn’t account for position? Because I’m pretty sure it does. Not defensive value, but defensive position, yes. Perhaps I’m misunderstanding. Say, Ichiro’s VORP is a lot higher as a CF than a RF.
Dave – Where are you getting the BRAA numbers from. I’m curious so I can take a peek.
BPro uses EQA (.260 for average) to compute BRAA on their site. There’s no positional adjustment at all for their EQA or BRAA.
“Value Over Replacement Player. The number of runs contributed beyond what a replacement-level player at the same position would contribute if given the same percentage of team plate appearances. VORP scores do not consider the quality of a player’s defense.”
Dave’s end result certainly seems to put the M’s players in the correct order of their contributions. But it seems to overrate their offensive output. The total is +31 runs for the regular lineup but the M’s scored 794 runs, which was exactly the AL average. On the other hand, it makes more sense compared to the MLB average of 777 runs. With home ballpark correction, the M’s were an above-average offense but I’m pretty sure that Linear Weights method does not make that correction. And I don’t believe the bench makes up for the difference, especially since the M’s didn’t make much use of the bench.
Or maybe it all says that the team should have scored more runs given the individual offensive contributions.
I’m a little confused. Basically, you’re saying that Vidro is worth less as an offensive player because he doesn’t play defense? So he’d be more valuable offensively if McLaren would have trotted him out to play second base more often, because for this metric it doesn’t matter how poorly you might do in the field, just that you technically occupy that spot defensively?
Aren’t you then effectively counting defense twice, both in this measure and tomorrow’s look at the defensive contributions, or does the DH spot simply take a zero for defense?
How do other DHs fare in the AL?
I’m going to take a whack at explaining this here.
It’s harder to find good bat’s at some positions then others. This is most likely because some positions are harder to play. Which positions are harder to play, or whether any position is harder to play is not relevant. The truth of the matter is that some positions are harder find good bats in.
This adjustment adjusts batting stats to show a player’s value to the team compared to who we could replace them with. We could not replace Ichiro with David Ortiz. We could not replace Yuni with Manny. So why compare apple to oranges?
So the adjustment compares players at the same position across the league and adjusts their offensive value accordingly.
re 25
As Dave mentioned, this calculation doesn’t factor in park effects. An AL average run producing team is above average, if they play half their games in Safeco.
22 – From what I’m understanding (which could be totally wrong) it’s not an adjustement on defense really, but on the difficulty of the position. If you’ve got two guys with the EXACT same offensive stats, but one can play SS and the other can only DH, who’s more valuable??
As Dave mentioned, this calculation doesn’t factor in park effects. An AL average run producing team is above average, if they play half their games in Safeco.
Dave did not mention this. There is a park factor included in the numbers. It’s just not broken down by handedness, so it applies the same park factor to LH/RH hitters.
And, I’ll start working on a comment that tries to explain this all to you guys who aren’t understanding how it works. But, meanwhile, no, it doesn’t double-count defense.
The offensive portion of LWTS is the player’s hitting stats relative to all players.
The defensive portion of whatever you use is the player’s fielding stats relative to players at his position.
So, you have two equations based on two different scales. You either use the same scale (say, hitting stats relative to players at his position), or apply an adjustment to rescale things.
Suppose you do that, compare the hitting and fielding to the average for that position. Your average SS = average 2B = average C = average 1B = average DH. But, is this necessarily true? Except for Catcher, all positions share the pool of players to some extent. This isn’t the NFL, where a QB is mostly a QB and a WR is a mostly a WR.
It’s not a given that an average SS = average 2B. If MLB filled their teams with guys like Royce Clayton, it will be apparent pretty quickly that the average 2B is better than the average SS. And, if they filled their teams with ARod, Jeter, etc as SS, the average SS would be better than the average 2B.
The problem lies in a process that forces, because it wants to, that the average 2B = average SS, even when we know it’s not possible (like this year).
What the +5/0 adjustment says is: “I don’t care what the actual average batting line is for SS and 2B this year. What it *should* be is 5 runs lower for the SS.” If the result is that the SS and 2B both hit the same, and since we know that the average SS is a better fielder than the average 2B, then we know that the average SS is better than the average 2B. And in this case, we think the average SS is 5 runs ahead of the average 2B.
Bermanator – You and I are struggling with the same thing here. Effecitvely counting defense twice. The key here I think is that poor preformance on a defensive scale (Vidro at 2B) would neutralize the offensive bump he gets from hitting as a 2B rather than a DH.
Perhaps people would object to this less of none of those positional modifiers were negative. That they’re negative makes them look like penalties even though they’re not (they’re positional adjustments).
So, instead, you could adjust based on replacement level fielding, defining replacement level as the glovework of a player who have no business playing any position other than DH (players like David Ortiz and Manny Ramirez come to mind).
If you do that, the adjustments look like this:
C: +25 runs
SS/CF: +20 runs
2B/3B: +15 runs
LF/RF: +10 runs
1B: +5 runs
DH: +0 runs
Then, the Mariners would be:
Ichiro: +44 runs
Ibanez: +29 runs
Guillen: +26 runs
Johjima: +26 runs
Beltre: +25 runs
Betancourt: +15 runs
Vidro: +12 runs
Sexson: -4 runs
Lopez: -7 runs
It shows the same distribution of talent – it just placed the bar lower (a replacement level defensive threshhold instead of an average level defensive threshhold). And this way no one can point to the DH numbers and claim we’re penalising them for having no defensive skill.
Dave will probably come in here soon and make it very clear, but it seems clear to me already:
This calculation, like VORP for example, looks at a player’s offensive contribution in relation to the offensive contributions of other players that play his position (or, more accurately, fall into his same place on the defensive spectrum). It does NOT look at actual defensive ability.
If you put Vidro at second base, yes, he would get +15 as compared to DH according to the scale Dave lists, but he would lose all of it back (and then same) based on the actual quality of his defense, which is not the subject of Dave’s post.
Grrrrrr….and I read that post explaining that. Grrrrr.
I’ll shut up and suck down more caffeine.
My wild ass guess at the end result after tomorrows adjustment for defense:
Ichiro: +29 runs plus 10 (very good defender) = +39 runs
Beltre: +10 runs plus 10 (very good defender) = +20 runs
Guillen: +11 runs +/- 0 (average defender) = +11 runs
Johjima: +11 runs +/- 0 (average defender) = +11 runs
Ibanez: +14 runs minus 10 (very bad defender) = +4 runs
Betancourt: +0 runs plus 3 (above average defender) = +3 runs
Vidro: -3 runs +/- 0 (did not play defense) = -3 runs
Lopez: -22 runs plus 3 (above average defender) = -19 runs
Sexson: -19 runs minus 10 (very bad defender) = -29 runs
Looks about right to me.
So he’d be more valuable offensively if McLaren would have trotted him out to play second base more often, because for this metric it doesn’t matter how poorly you might do in the field, just that you technically occupy that spot defensively?
On this metric, yes, playing Vidro at second every day would have made him score better (assuming he hit equally well).
But that’s okay. This metric is implicitly assuming average defensive performance. Adding actual defensive value will refine these numbers further.
Tomorrow’s gonna be a choo-choo train of crappy defense.
#26 I looked up some DH’s using BPro’s (again, not sure what Dave is using) BRAA. These are adjusted for the season, which accounts for level of scoring, HOME PARK, team pitching and baserunning.
Ortiz – 60
Huff – 2
Hafner – 17
Sheffield – 19
Thomas – 19
Thome – 33
To sum up as I understand it from the post, defensive position is included in these numbers solely to evaluate how difficult it is to find a quality bat that can also play that position.
i.e. any hitter can be a DH, so the expected baseline offensive contribution from that position is higher; by way of contrast, it is much harder to find a hitter who can also play an MLB-caliber shortstop, so the expected baseline offensive contribution is lower.
There is no adjustment for actual defensive ability in these numbers; it’s just a way of saying that a SS doesn’t have to hit as well as a DH for his offensive contribution to be positive for the position.
Dave’s tackled two steps in this post, the next one comes tomorrow. If you’re having a problem with step 2 (positional adjustment), lump it in with tomorrow’s step 3 instead of today’s step 1:
Step 1: hitting
Step 2: position
Step 3: how well you field your position
****
Regarding the DH positional adjustment, consider that anyone playing DH is forcing the team’s second-worst defender to play the field. Ortiz forces Manny’s awful glove to play left field. Vidro’s lack of fielding talent helps keep Ibanez in the field.
****
Since Dave used league-average as the baseline, negative numbers don’t represent negative overall value — just negative value compared to the average player (or average position).
Oh, according to BPro Ibanez’s BRAA was 16. He was a hair short of Hafner actually (which says more to the crappy year Hafner had then Ibanez being the new Edgar or something).
Speaking of hitting and Ibanez I did a little digging on OBI and OBI%. OBI is ‘Others Batted In’. It’s someone’s total RBI minus their homeruns. Mostly I’m curious if it’s a repeatable skill and if it’s affected by team performance. Both (at this VERY early stage) appear to be ‘yes’. Ibanez seems to have consistently lead or been right near the top of the team every year since 2000. When the team plays well, his OBI% is really high (17-19%), when the team sucks it’s low (14-16%), but he is still near the top for that team. Again, I’ve looked at only a few guys, Ibanez, Sexson and Matsui (always refered to as an ‘RBI guy’). I’ve also dug around some other players too. It’s all pretty interesting and is a useful tool to figure out who to bat #4 I’d think.
Ummmmmm…..
It’s not a skill.
It’s affected by team performance.
It should not be used to determine batting order.
Okay, for those still struggling despite the good explanations provided by tango, skyking, etc…, here you go.
Imagine we’re picking teams at a sandlot. 100 guys show up to tryout. We’ve got 10 positions to fill, and want to put the best team we can out there. We want to start separating the 100 guys into groups to give us chances to view the best options, so we start setting up qualifiers.
We know that our 3B/SS/2B all have to throw right-handed, as you can’t have a lefty trying to wing the ball across the diamond. So, sorting step #1: Take all lefty throwers and put them in their own group.
Now, you have 80 guys in one group and 20 in another. The 20 guys are now DH/1B/LF/RF/CF only, but the other 80 can still potentially play anywhere. Now, you sort again, this time based on footspeed. For CF/SS, you want a minimum 5.0 40-yard dash, so you have everyone run a sprint and time them.
Of the 20 left-handed throwers, 5 qualify. Of the 80 right-handed throwers, 20 qualify. So now you have four groups – 60 right-handed throwing “slow” guys, 15 left-handed throwing “slow” guys, 20 right-handed throwing “fast” guys, and 5 left-handed throwing “fast” guys.
Your shortstop and center fielder have to come from the fast group, so you’re going to pick the two best guys you can from that pool of 25 players, with the caveat that the shortstop has to throw right-handed. This means that if the two best guys both throw left-handed, you can only take one of them. So, let’s say you end up with the best and third best fast guys, and wham, you have your center fielder and shortstop.
Now, you’d naturally expect these guys to hit less than the other positions simply because you had filtered out 75% of the original pool of hitters. All the big lumbering oafs weren’t included in the SS/CF pool, so you know that you’re not as likely to get a great hitter there as you are at the other positions.
You continue on with this exercise, filtering out guys with weak arms from the third base pool, guys with bad footwork from the second base pool, and guys who just can’t run from the LF/RF pool. In the end, maybe your pool of available players looked something like this:
C: 10 guys
SS/CF: 25 guys
3B/2B: 45 guys
LF/RF: 80 guys
1B; 95 guys
DH: 100 guys
You knew you could pick absolutely anyone to DH, and almost anyone to play first base, but then, the filters started weeding people out pretty quickly after that.
Looking at these pools of players, your minimum expectations for offensive production would be way, way higher for DH than any other position because you could literally pick the best hitter and not have to worry about his defense. But, when it came to the other positions, you’d already ruled out most of the good hitters, so you might find yourself not even being able to take the fourth best hitter (out of 100, remember) because he doesn’t fit anywhere on your team.
This is what the position adjustment accounts for – expectation of offense from that particular pool of players. The larger the pool, the higher the expectation.
Tomorrow, when we tackle defense, we’ll begin to separate players based on their defensive abilities within the predefined player pools.
It might be off-topic in this thread, but [deleted, off-topic in this thread]
Dave – Where are you getting the BRAA numbers from. I’m curious so I can take a peek.
These are linear weights. It’s just the average run values of each play multiplied by the frequency of those plays. You can read up on linear weights on Tango’s site.
Dave – Thanks, great explanation. On another note, I never knew there were no LH 3B.
Good explanation.
It should be noted that the lefties are not excluded at SS, only true at the MLB level. In high school (or pickup games), you can have a lefty throwing SS. Ken Griffey Jr or Darin Erstad would likely have been the best fielding SS in their high schools (or some high schools anyway). A lefty throwing Ozzie Smith would probably have been an average MLB SS, I’d guess.
The handedness penalty, while severe, can still be overcomed, if the difference between the two players is large enough. (I’d guess 20 runs.)
That technicality aside, Dave’s post stands.
I guess I should explain that a little better. So, last year Raul came up to the plate with 430 men on. He drove in 19.535% (1st in LF) of them. Best on the team. Richie trailed the ‘full-timers’ at 12.317% (9th @ 1B). The rest and their ranks at that position in the AL (min. 400PA).
Ichiro – 16.986% 4th
Beltre – 16.258% 5th
Guillen – 16.034% 6th
Betancourt – 15.847% 6th
Lopez – 13.747% 5th
Johjima – 13.39% 7th
Vidro – 13.217% 8th (of 9)
Burke – 12.791%
Broussard – 12.664%
Willie – 9.48% (!!)
Dave-
So those numbers I assume are calculations reflecting the primary position played, correct? (In other words, Video is a DH, not [(.07*1B)+(.07*2B)+ (.86*DH and Other)]?
Would you count Bloomquist as an outfielder, or is there a separate weight for utility guys? I apologize if that info is already on Tango’s site, but for some reason it’s not loading properly for me right now.
I enjoyed #45 as much as I did the original post. IMO, you should make that a separate post so that it doesn’t get lost in the shuffle.
This may not help, but since I’m usually one of those that takes an extra beat to follow along with this stuff, I just wanted to chime in about the confusion.
I think (maybe incorrectly) that this is the key distinction:
The original post is not measuring the offensive contribution of a given player, but the VALUE of the offensive contribution of a given player.
Galexieboi
Does that stat, however, tell us anything valuable that wouldn’t be better explained by slugging percentage?
There’s too much room for noise in that sample. Someone batting lower in a weaker order may have come up to bat 300 times with men on base ahead of him, but 190 of those were on first base.
Raul’s 430 baserunners ahead of him might have included 200 guys standing on third base. (and wouldn’t that have been nice).
(Please note, these are not real numbers, I’m just chosing random examples).
It’s a lot easier to drive in a guy from third than first.
Just because you can count something doesn’t mean it’s significant. Like RBIs and runs scored this figure depends significantly on how well your team mates are hitting. I doubt if that stat is worth a damn.
DMZ – I can see how having someone fast on 1st or 2nd like Ichiro can help Ibanez, but saying there’s no skill involved doesn’t make sense to me. It’s not like it’s a rate stat like RBI, it’s a percentage of available runs driven in. If a player can show a consistent ability to drive in a high percentage of runners it’s worth looking at, no? If you’ve already done research on this please let me know because I’m interested.
Regarding Vidro at second, I think what’s tripping some people up is the fact that Vidro may actually be an above average 2B and a below average DH, but it is still better for the team to play him at DH.
Let’s assume that Vidro’s defense at 2B is -10 (chosen for the purpose of demonstration, not accuracy); if so, his value as a second baseman is +2 (off=12 + pos adj=0 + def=-10), and his value as a DH is -3. He contributes 2 runs more than the average 2B and 3 runs less than the average DH. But, if the team were to play Vidro at second, and if they were limited to choosing from the same pool of starters, that would mean Lopez would have to DH – and Lopez’s split between 2B and DH is much worse than Vidro’s. Even if Lopez is a below average 2B (say -22 off, +0 pos adj, +5 def), the team may still want to play him at second and Vidro at DH and go with two below average players at their respective positions, because it would be better than playing an above average 2B in Vidro and an atrociously below average DH in Lopez (-22 off, -15 pos adj, +0 def).
Of course, the team isn’t forced to choose just between Lopez and Vidro: you could stick Vidro at second and Jones at DH, which (under my ‘Vidro -10 2B defense assumption’ that was not chosen for accuracy) may actually be better. But the point is that turning Vidro from a below average player to an above average one by changing his position could conceivably hurt the team. It’s counterintuitive but, under certain conditions, true.
On a similar point about double counting defensive ability, a quick syllogism:
positional adjustments are constant: the same for every position on every team, regardless of who is playing where (all AL teams will always have a net -15 positional adjustment, regardless of the quality of their defense);
therefore positional adjustments do not count defensive ability (because they are *constant*);
therefore they cannot be responsible for double counting defense. Does that make sense?
Colm – That’s a really good thought. I can look at the number of times runners were on which base and the percentage of those driven in. That might be a lot more helpful. Thanks!
Also, a player who drives in fewer of those runners from third might be the more valuable player based entirely on how he does or doesn’t drive them in. Ibanez might hit 150 sac flies with those 200 runners on third, while some other random player might hit 100 homeruns. Raul had 50% more OBI, but he was the lesser player.
So, aside from it being a randomly selected small sample, and it being hugely context dependent, it’s not measuring anything useful.
galaxieboi – The skill necessary to hit a double with no one on is no different than the skill necessary to hit a double with two men on.
A hit is a hit, regardless of whether other teammates have reached base.
Evan – Yeah, I can see where I made an error. I don’t think it’s a small sample by any means. 430 runners makes for a decent sized-sample for a player, but yes, it is too context dependent. What I was aiming for was something that could help is all.
I’m a little confused. Basically, you’re saying that Vidro is worth less as an offensive player because he doesn’t play defense? So he’d be more valuable offensively if McLaren would have trotted him out to play second base more often, because for this metric it doesn’t matter how poorly you might do in the field, just that you technically occupy that spot defensively?
Here’s the way to understand the -15 adjustment for DHs.
Who is the best hitter among this group of players?
a) David Ortiz
b) Frank Thomas
c) Travis Hafner
d) Jose Vidro
Now, who is the best hitter among this group of players?
a) Dustin Pedroia
b) Aaron Hill
c) Josh Barfield
d) Jose Vidro
The first group are DHs. Vidro compares relatively poorly to them. The second group are 2Bs (from the same three teams). Vidro compares relatively favorably to them (as a hitter). The moral of the story is, you face tougher competition, as a hitter, at DH than at 2b. If Vidro is your DH, then Ortiz is not. On the other hand, if Vidro is your 2b, then Dustin Pedroia isn’t. Ortiz OPS+ was 176. Pedroia’s was 115. The opportunity cost of playing a batter at DH is higher than the opportunity cost of playing him at 2b. That is what the -15 adjusts for.
Aren’t you then effectively counting defense twice, both in this measure and tomorrow’s look at the defensive contributions, or does the DH spot simply take a zero for defense?
No, what position someone plays and how well they play it are two different things. The defensive rankings are relative to others at the position, so yes, the DH would take a zero (since, by defnintion, all DHs make equal defensive contributions). The hypothetical example lokiforever gave about Randy Winn shows how this works.
Basically what we thought all along. Vidro should have been on the bench, Ibanez should be the DH, and Adam Jones should have been the everyday left fielder.
430 plate appearances isn’t particularly small, but it’s smaller than the full season, and you’d always rather have the bigger sample when trying to see information through the noise.
Wait, no that’s 430 runners, not plate appearances, so now you’re double-counting for some hitters and not others based on how many runners were on base at a time, so now you can’t even tell how big your sample is, and its size will differ greater between players.
There is no skill in OBI%.
#57 – So, you would argue there’s no seperate skill to hitting with men on base than there is with the bases empty? Such as hitting to the right side of the field or getting more air under the ball(or less).
I can’t help but wonder looking at Lopez’s disaster of a year and the way Morse hit the ball at the end of the season this year if the Mariners would consider having Morse challenging for the starting second baseman job next year and giving him an off season to learn the position.
The best case scenario would probably be here that Lopez improves considerably next year while the Mariners have a much better utility man than WFB in Mike Morse.
But that’s just a thought. . .
Unfortunately when you consider the way Lopez hit this year on top of what Morse did as a September call up and WFB’s scrappy-doo peformance again, Bavasi’s frivolous contract extensions and trades once again prove to be the gifts that keep on giving.
The opportunity cost of playing a batter at DH is higher
I’m not sure clarification for the layman should ever include references to opportunity cost.
Your point is exactly right, but if someone didn’t understand Dave’s initial point I’m not sure bringing up opportunity cost will help.
Can we stop hijacking this thread to discuss the relative worthlessness of a newly created statistic?
I’m just scared to see the defensive number that Raul put up this past year. I’m sure it wont be pretty
Evan – Yes, hitters have no control over who’s on in front of them. I originally was going to back track over multiple seasons to check for repeat performance. Though according to some of the input here I’d be wasting my time.
Vidro is a good example. Dave has him as being +12 compared to all hitters.
(Here, under “BtRuns” he’s +12.6:
http://www.baseball-reference.com/v/vidrojo01.shtml
)
Note that he only played 90% of the season and therefore the -15 run penalty (for 162 games), comes out to a bit worse than -13 runs.
In effect, for a DH, he’s an average hitter. With no fielding accomplishments (let’s assume he didn’t play 1B/2B), that’s where he sits. Average.
What however would have happened had he played 2B? He keeps his +12.6 runs as a hitter, with no 2B penalty. However, he would have stunk as a fielder. How much worse would he have been? Let’s say he’d have been -17.6 runs as a fielder. Under this scenario, he’s -5.0 runs if he played as a 2B.
What if he was a 1B? He’s +12.6 runs as a hitter get a 10 run penalty down to +2.6 runs. And maybe he’d be a bit below average fielder, say -4.6 runs. As a 1B, he’d be -2 runs.
What if he played C? He’s +12.6 runs as a hitter, plus a 10 run boost. As a catcher, he’d probably stink the joint, being -42.6 runs. Overall, as a C, he’s -20 runs.
You can go through every position, and the optimal spot for Vidro (where he has most value), is probably DH, where he’d have as much value as an average player at an average position.
Of couse, by locking him into DH, you really place a chokehold as to what you can do with the rest of your team.
In any case, that’s what the penalty/bonus tries to do, to account for the pool of players so that, for the typical player, he’d have the same value across all 9 positions. Vidro is less flexible, and therefore, has more value at DH.
Consider it closed.
Speaking of ‘closed’ I thought we’d put the ‘Morse to second base’ idea to bed some time ago.
#69 – It’s not pretty.
In an attempt to amplify the Runs Added Above Average discussion a bit –
Another way to think about the issue is to consider how you would replace a particular guys production if he were unavailable.
If Ichiro were unavailable, you could not swap in David Ortiz to take his place. You can only replace him with a player who has equals or exceeds a minimum threshold proficiency at the position.
Ichiro’s contribution thsn is compared with all of the other players who might be able to fill his position – because if you didn’t have Ichiro you would have to take one of the other qualified CF players.
And we’re not double counting defense because at this point we haven’t accounted at all for the defensive prowess of players. For the moment each player in each postion is essentially credited as being an average defender at his position. The only defensive criterion we’ve applied is that the player must be minimally credible at playing his position.
In a future post Dave is going to take a stab at developing the defensive capabilities for each players.
Regarding Vidro at second, I think what’s tripping some people up is the fact that Vidro may actually be an above average 2B and a below average DH, but it is still better for the team to play him at DH…It’s counterintuitive but, under certain conditions, true.
Yes, similar counterintuitive situations crop up in economics, where they generally fall under the concept of Comparative Advantage. And, just as in economics, understanding and exploiting comparative advantage enables you to maximize the return on the resources and talents available to you.
The Mariners finish the year 88-74 despite being outscored by 19 runs on the year
And the Diamondbacks were outscored by 20 runs on the year, and won 90 games (11 more than the Pythagorean prediction) — more than any other team in the NL. Of course, if the M’s were playing in the NL things would’ve been different: with their record, they could’ve comfortably won the NL Central and been in contention for the NL East (I find it amazing the M’s ended up with the same record as the Mets: who would’ve predicted that in March?) The NL was the definition of parity (or mediocrity) this year: The record for fewest wins by a league leader in a 162-game schedule was 91, held by the 1983 Dodgers, the ‘82 Cardinals, the ‘74 Orioles, and the ‘67 Red Sox. The new record is now held by those 90-win Diamondbacks. If they go deep into the postseason, be prepared to hear a lot about the “genius of Bob Melvin.”
Ok, Dave (and Tango),
I believe I have a better understanding based on your last explanations. Where I was getting stuck is you started talking about defense in the context of what is an exclusively offensive analysis (sort of). It threw me because I am sure we’d use a completely different analysis when we got to wrap-up part 2 (something focusing on runs saved rather than on a universal positional valuation that has nothing to do with whether you are Ken Griffey Jr. or Adam Jones).
But, I think I understand now that the focus is exclusively on talent pool – what percentage of the general population can even play a certain position is really, in part, an offensive factor, in that you can’t simply plug any guy into the SS line in the line-up and pretend that everybody is available for that position. It’s WORTH something be a SS-able player, and an offensive production from somebody capable of playing a position requiring a rarer skillset is – in itself – a factor to be taken into account.
The only way to do that in analyzing the offensive side of things is to create a fair positional “value chart” assigning some number that reflects that it’s a lot harder to hit as a SS than as DH because there are fewer SS-able players (certainly the handedness issues is a further drill-down (a left-handed power hitting 1B might be worth more than a right-handed one).
Am I starting to understand? If I am, then Ichiro would get a bump when comparing him to Magglio even in an analysis focused purely on offense since he’s part of a smaller pool of players able to hit at all as a CF, or can you not do that?
Dave: Great post, and great clarification (along with Tango’s, and a few others). I got it the first time, but was thinking along the lines of a “it’s a handicap, not a penalty” explanation, which isn’t really as clear as what you, Tango, Steve, and a few others have offered.
One question/comment, though. Using your 100 player/sandlot example, isn’t it a bit backward to start with DH and assume you can put any of the 100 guys there? While true, you might then end up using a great hitter there who happens to also be a great fielder (somebody like Ichiro, say). I know that this is a continuum, and you are constantly adjusting who is in what pool depending on the needs of the other pools, but . . . it just seems backward to me given the analogy of picking a sandlot team. In reality, I would start by analyzing defense, figuring out who could play where without regard to offense, and then I’d pick the best combination of offense and defense after I had them settled into positional pools graded by relative defensive ability at those positions.
Minor point – semantics, even, since players obviously can be in several positional “pools” – but I’m curious if it’s just me that’s bugged by that.
Put another way, what bugged me is that if the position adjustment/handicap for DH is built on the assumption that you could put anybody at DH and that you had the entire pool to pick from and get your absolutely best offensive player, then that isn’t really true. 1996-era Alex Rodriguez is never going to DH. Neither would Willie Mays, or Ichiro (except on “days off”). In reality, the size of the pool depends on how many of those great offensive players are already siphoned off into the “elite defensive position” pools.
I think.
I wonder if it’s a good idea to have a sidebar of items, each with an explanatory sentence or two, of things that have been adequately answered but keep coming up (such as playing Morse at second base). It’s worked well for bigger subjects, like the relative value of pitching metrics.
hejuk/55: “Vidro may actually be an above average 2B and a below average DH,”
Post 71 clearly shows the possibility that he’d be a below average 2B
***
Pete/77: In a real sense, what you’d do is evaluate each player for every position. So, how would Ichiro do at CF, SS, 1B, etc as a fielder. Let’s say he converts 80% of balls at CF into an out, and he converts 82% of balls at 1B into an out. Then you try Vidro, and he’d convert 60% of CF balls into an out, and 77% of balls at 1B into an out. You go through every single player at every single position, and add in their offensive numbers (relative to all players). Your best combination is what you go with.
Dave’s example was simplified, and no need to try to get too deep into it. It’s a basic model.
Yea, Pete, I actually had the pools written as 25/43/61 etc… initially, but then decided I didn’t want to confuse everyone even further, and reverted to the easier-to-understand round numbers.
But, as a technicality, you’re correct – you start with the hardest position, remove the guy you choose from that position, and then widdle the pool accordingly. So the DH pool is 100 players minus the nine already chosen, or 91 of the 100.
But, for this kind of analysis, it’s not going to make a real difference.
Am I starting to understand? If I am, then Ichiro would get a bump when comparing him to Magglio even in an analysis focused purely on offense since he’s part of a smaller pool of players able to hit at all as a CF, or can you not do that?
Yea, you got it. Even if Ichiro and Magglio were comparable defenders relative to their positional peers, you still would have to adjust for the fact that Ichiro’s peers are significantly better defenders and worse hitters than Magglio’s peers.
Basically, summing up: total value is offensive value + position adjustment + defensive value.
77-Pete: if you were picking a sandlot team, yes, you’d pick the DH last from whomever was left over after you’d filled out the more-difficult-to-fill positions. It’s quite possible the best hitter would’ve already gone into those other slots, but that doesn’t change the fact that any of them could have been picked for DH, and in fact would have been if there happened to be one better hitter at their position.
Since we’re throwing out examples, here’s one: Jeff Clement. As a slugging catcher (and a lefty in Safeco as a bonus) he’s hugely valuable as offensive piece, because you get to plug in a strong bat and cover the premium defenisve position at the same time — and that has nothing to do with how good he is as a catcher, just that he can play that position. But if it turns out he can’t catch, his value declines considerably: he’s not nearly so valuable at 1B (because there are other slugging 1st basemen and you have have a lesser bat at the catcher’s spot). At DH he’s less valuable still, because the pool of potential DHs is “anybody in baseball” (and there are some guys like Ortiz who have no business putting on a glove).
I’d like to endorse Tango’s suggestion that the M’s play Vidro at catcher next year. That way they either get above average hitting at the catcher position or (assuredly) he immediately gets hurt, solving once and for all the Jones/Ibanez conundrum in left……
Thanks, Dave. It makes a lot of sense. It’s seems to me that this kind of thinking will really save a lot of effort and avoid bad decisions in both roster construction and trade valuation. It also makes me much angrier about some of the players we chased (and overpaid) last offseason.
No, what position someone plays and how well they play it are two different things. The defensive rankings are relative to others at the position, so yes, the DH would take a zero (since, by defnintion, all DHs make equal defensive contributions). The hypothetical example lokiforever gave about Randy Winn shows how this works.
Yeah, I get it now … I figured that the doesn’t-field-a-position penalty would show up in tomorrow’s post (or whenever Dave discusses defense), which is why I asked about the double-counting. But I’m guessing now that a DH would rate a 0 or an N/A there.
Hey, 88-74! Welcome to the club. (NY Mets)
Yeah, the Mets have joined the club, but is it hopeful or disheartening that for the M’s that record is a big step forward, whereas for the Mets it’s the result of one of the biggest collapses in MLB history?
for the M’s that record is a big step forward, whereas for the Mets it’s the result of one of the biggest collapses in MLB history?
Who said that record wasn’t the result of one of the biggest collapses in MLB history…for the M’s?
This system makes perfect sense, and pretty much sums up how the players played this year, using stats to back up claims. Another excellent job by Dave using statistics to prove a point.
Without statistics, we all knew that Sexson and Lopez were doing terrible and killing offensive chances for the team. While we knew Gullien, Johjima, Ibanez, Beltre gave above average performance, and Ichiro is the shooting star, while betancourt and vidro are average. Now what Dave figures out is a estimate of about how many runs they cost us. And the fact for adding or subtracting runs based on position helps out too. It would be much harder to find a slugging catcher then a slugging first baseman.
Id agree Vidro would have value if he was faster and play a position other than 1st, but adding a slap hitter who can only hit singles as your DH isn’t going to get us that far.
In general, great job again Dave.
Will there be a similar analysis on how many runs against each pitcher cost?
and in “Just a tad over the top” news:
“Glavine’s star career stained forever”– Bob Klapisch
Opportunity costs is a fairly easy concept to understand. Gaining $1 when I could’ve gained $5 is equivalent to losing $4, for the most part.
As I understand it, the reason why Vidro gets an offensive penalty for being a DH is because while the team gained +12 runs, they could’ve gained more given that every single person can play DH. And now that I think about it, the effect is probably worse (if only slightly) than simply losing the “opportunity runs,” since those runs will go to an opponent, an important factor in a game where the goal is simply to score more runs than the other team.
Who said that record wasn’t the result of one of the biggest collapses in MLB history…for the M’s?
Because it wasn’t. Even if you accept the M’s performance over the last 5 weeks as a “collapse,” it wasn’t historic. But given how far above themselves the Mariners were (briefly) playing, it wasn’t a collapse so much as a return to expectations (which in fact they actually ended the season still exceeding, given their RS / RA numbers). But we’ve had this argument before, and it’s off-topic here.
and in “Just a tad over the top” news:
“Glavine’s star career stained forever”– Bob Klapisch
That was ridiculous.
When I was little, we saw the Orioles-Brewers game that ended the 1982 regular season — both teams entered tied atop the AL East, so it was winner-take-all. Jim Palmer started for the Orioles and got knocked around early, and Milwaukee won.
And yet, somehow Palmer’s career was not stained forever.
I’m assuming Glavine’s won’t be either. It was just a terrible game at the worst possible time.
Thanks for the work, Dave. As a long-time believer in the importance of defense, it often annoys me to hear people slobbering over offensive production only. I don’t have the capability of putting things into numbers, so I really appreciate your insight and post.
Even if you accept the M’s performance over the last 5 weeks as a “collapse,” it wasn’t historic. But given how far above themselves the Mariners were (briefly) playing, it wasn’t a collapse so much as a return to expectations
It was historic, as was repeatedly pointed out in the press, for a team so far above .500 so late in the season to have an extended losing stretch as bad as the Mariners had. That would seem to qualify as a collapse.
Whether the team was exceeding expectations before the collapse is immaterial to the question. But I agree that the topic is a digression, and won’t argue the issue any further in this thread.
Awesome post and discussion. Learned a lot here today. Odd that this bit of conversation has been more interesting then the last 2 weeks of the season.
I’m sure people tend to gloss over defense because it’s much harder to quantify. There are a million ways to measure hitting and pitching, but defense is awfully subjective. One scorer’s error is another’s “too hot to handle”. And really, chicks don’t usually dig the ‘D’.
77-Pete: if you were picking a sandlot team, yes, you’d pick the DH last from whomever was left over after you’d filled out the more-difficult-to-fill positions.
Not necessarily, and that’s one value of the positional adjustment scheme. If it was your pick, and Ortiz and Betancourt were available, you’d probably pick Ortiz, even though he’d be your DH. I imagine Ortiz bat was at least +50 runs this year, so with the -15 adjustment, he’d still be +35. So, despite playing a position with a severe negative adjustment, Ortiz provides so much offensive power, he’s worth a high round sandlot draft pick.
On the other hand, if it’s Vidro and Betancourt, then you go with Betancourt.
And really, chicks don’t usually dig the ‘D’.
I suspect that’s because my less knowledgable sisters rely on their menfolk to tell them what’s important and in my experience, guys really dig the long ball.
I really enjoyed this post / thread!
People had already touched on this subject with regart to Ichiro! when he switched from RF to C, but it really helps clarify things to go through the exercise of rating the whole team by performance and positional adjustment.
Is there a way you can bring the non-starters and/or multi-position guys numbers into the mix so as to be able to evaluate them as well? It’d be great to rate the back-up players / subs to see who should have gotten more / less playing time… Also, it’d be fun if someone could run these numbers for last year to compare.
I’m really looking forward to the defensive ratings and combined final ratings for the team. Sexson looks like he’ll be the clear loser on total value when this is all done. That should help quantify the angst toward him and further drive home the idea that the M’s need to find a better solution at 1B.
“I suspect that’s because my less knowledgable sisters rely on their menfolk to tell them what’s important and in my experience, guys really dig the long ball.”
So, this is our own fault then. Or at least Stuart Scott’s for going, ‘BOO YAH!!’ all the time.
Quantifying defense usefully — which has come so far in recent years that “defense is much harder to quantify than hitting and pitching” is possibly the most overrated piece of common wisdom in baseball these days — has almost nothing to do with scorer’s decisions. Modern defensive analysis cares very little about whether a play is an error or a hit, and cares much more about whether a play was made or not, period.
99-JMHawkins:
I think the analogy is to that of a team tryout, not an actual game where there would be a draft.
Unless I’m misreading something, all 100 guys who show up at the sandlot are trying out for one team, so you wouldn’t need to “pick” Ortiz as your DH before filling the shortstop position. If you fill all your positions on the field, David Ortiz is still going to be leaning on the fence waiting to get picked.
Er, I meant (of course) that Ichiro! switched to CF not C. I’m sure he’d be a great catcher, but that goes back to the opportunity cost thing.
everything is Stuart Scott’s fault.
104 is right in his explanation.
scraps – Yeah, for you and me. But when all that’s listed on a player’s bio us ERRORS, it makes it a little harder for people to grasp things like ‘range’ and ‘zone’ factors and such. That’s the point I meant to get across, I’m sorry it didn’t come across the right way.
The only thing I’m not sure of is how we arrive at the -15 runs for the DH. I’ve seen the post that these numbers are influenced by and it doesn’t mention the DH, what it does say however is that 1B has -9. Now surely given that the vast majority of players can play 1B (Vidro included) the DH penalty should be roughly similar. There aren’t many DH’s who are so bad in the field that they couldn’t step in and play 1B on occasion. Why is there such a gap between 1B and DH?
99: So, would you rather field a hypothetical team with David Ortiz at each position or Yuni at each position? =)
Considering just hitting and fielding, I’d go with Ortiz.
But if they had to pitch, too, I’d go with Yuni.
I’m guessing stepping in and playing 1B on occasion and actually being above average there are two different things. Sure, Ortiz could play 1B now, but he’d probably wouldn’t be Pujols doing it.
Ortiz is probably one of the worst first basemen in baseball.
Think about it. If Ortiz could play first base, then the Red Sox could have Manny DH. That they make Manny play the field, despite being perhaps the worst fielder at any position in baseball history, tells you a lot about what the Red Sox think about Ortiz’s ability in the field (plus the extent to which the team thinks fielding will affect either’s durability).
110,111 – that’s actually an interesting hypothetical question that sort of brings out one of the points of this thread.
I don’t know that a team with David Ortiz at every position would beat a team of Yunis (assuming the same pitcher for both teams). Ortiz is not only a horrible defender at 1st, but throws left-handed. I’d seriously think the team of Yunis would win, simply because almost no ground ball would produce an out and few fly balls would. Certainly Ortiz is much more valuable of a player than Yuni, but it ties back into Dave’s point about talent pool.
A team of all Yunis could bunt for base hits all day long.
Evan – I was trying to make a joke and help explain the 6 run difference between DH and 1B to bunk_medal at the same time. See, like you pointed out, Ortiz is a sucky 1Bman (in the blue moon he plays there) and Pujols is sick at 1st. Get it? You COULD plop Ortiz at first and ‘pays your money and takes your chances’ as they say. If you stuck Ortiz anywhere else, well…yech.
Hmm, here’s another way to look at the wrapup:
2006 Mariners: 756 runs scored, 792 runs allowed, -36 run differential
2007 Mariners: 794 runs scored, 813 runs allowed, -19 run differential
So- we expanded the payroll by 10 million or so, and got 17 runs. Way to go Bill!
Also, if anyone is going to argue that the 88-74 record this year, despite being outscored, represents a REAL and repeatable skill, I have a bridge to sell you, because 100 years of baseball history says it ain’t so. This is a .500 team that got lucky.
112 – in the context of this post we’re not talking about being ‘good’ at first base though, just good enough to play the position regularly. Granted you could make this argument about any position, but the point I was trying to make was that there doesn’t seem to be the same gap in defensive ability between many DH’s and first basemen (for instance our own decidedly poor defensive first baseman Richie Sexson) as there is between say… a second baseman and a right-fielder; however the scale we’re using here would suggest that the difference is the same.
I’m not questioning the principle here, I just think the weighting seems a bit off. There’s a large difference between the amount of players capable of playing 2B and the amount capable of playing RF/LF, but a much smaller difference between those who can play 1B and those who can only DH.
I think the difference between DH and 1B really is that large. Guys like Frank Thomas, David Ortiz, Jim Thome, and Jose Vidro – they physically cannot play the field on a regular basis. Their bodies won’t let them. They’d break down if they had to put that kind of strain on their knees (and, in Thome’s case, his back).
Opportunity cost is measured with respect to other opportunities you have (hence the name), so it can be a little bit deceiving in this context: Dave’s numbers are relative to league-average players, and the M’s don’t have the opportunity to acquire a league-average player at every position, while at other positions they can add above-average players to their roster (read: Adam Jones). So playing Lopez at 2B doesn’t necessarily have an opportunity cost of -17ish (whatever the defense number is) for this particular organization at this particular time, because we may not be able to acquire a league-average 2B right now. Whereas, for DH, Vidro is -3 and Ibanez is +4 (and Jones is in left), so the actual opportunity cost of playing Vidro is 7 runs. To do an opportunity cost analysis (which would really be more useful in looking at personnel moves), you’d have to get numbers for players within the organization who could compete at a given position, plus all the players available in trades, and compare them. (Or, if looking at all possible trades is too much work, you could just assume a baseline of replacement-level.)
That’s a good point, Dave. I know there’s a lot of DH-haters in the world, but I’m glad we get a couple extra years (or just years period) from Ortiz and Frank. Those guys probably would’ve had to have hung it up a long time ago with out a DH spot. It’s gotta be better than watching the pitcher hit.
I think the difference between DH and 1B really is that large
Of course, if Raul’s really a terrible, horrible LF, he might not be that much better a 1B.
I’m of the opinion that he needs to DH, personally, and only should take the field in dire extremis, or if he’s playing someplace with a tiny LF area to cover.
Sorry, I don’t mean to imply that opportunity cost is the wrong principle here – it’s the right one. I just don’t want somebody thinking the numbers themselves represent the opportunity cost for the organization of playing a particular player at a particular position.
Actually I have more of a philosophical question then anything else:
Why DONT teams pick a shortstop type defensive whiz for second base too? I realize there are more right handers in baseball and, therefore, more pull hitters, so that the short stop will get more action. But generally your thirdbasemen will also be over there to help out. So, essentially, you have to have a good skills defender and an average skills defender on the left side to prevent more basehits.
But why not the right? If you’re already sticking an “inbetween” type person at second base, and putting a defensive liability at first, doesn’t that just make your overall defense for the right side horrible? I know there aren’t a ton of left handed hitters, but a lot of them are pull hitters, and we do see hitters try to poke a ball to the right side quite often. It becomes doubly obvious when the first baseman has to hold a runner on first, leaving a larger hole to cover for the second baseman.
Why doesn’t it behoove teams to put an equally as strong defensive player at second base to compensate for the shittiness of the first baseman? It doesn’t sound like it would be that hard to do.
You need to bear in mind, though, is that these numbers are about the ability to play league average defense at the position mentioned, not just someone you can have stand at that spot in the field.
By definition, everyone can play league average defense at a position that doesn’t play defense; but the pool of people who can play league average defense at even the least demanding defensive position is significantly smaller.
The weighting seems about right, to me.
Because strong defensive shortstops are rare, and thus generally costly, either in terms of salary, in talent to acquire, or by not being able to hit at all.
There aren’t enough strong defensive shortstops that can also hit major league pitching running around to make getting two of them a a cost effective strategy. If you have both Adam Everett and John McDonald, you’re better off trading one of them to a team that needs an SS rather than letting their considerable defensive skills be inefficiently used at second base.
As far as right-side defense, too, teams can shift to help with that.
So if you have an extreme lefty pull groundball hitter (whew!), you can just shift the defense around so that the SS is basically at the second base bag, effectively “flipping” the standard defense.
The ability to do that, combined with what Dave says about defensive scarcity, gives you your answer.
By the way…is it legal for two fielders to “swap” for a play as long as they’re both in the lineup at the time? i.e. Have the shortstop cover second and the second baseman move to the usual shortstop slot?
I’m not sure there’s many situations where it’d be SMART to do, but I don’t know if the rules allow it.
DH VORPs for 2007, a comparison:
Ortiz 86.2
Thome 47.4
Cust 32.6
Thomas 31.5
Hafner 30.7
Sheffield 30.4
Vidro 24.4
Huff 15.8
Butler 11.6
Compared to what other teams are paying for their DHs – with the notable and not unusual exception of Oakland – the Mariners did a pretty decent job of getting good value out of their DH.
BUT, I’d take Ibanez at DH and Jones in Left any day over Vidro at DH and Ibanez in left. The Mariners need to be smarter than this.
VORP is the wrong tool to use.
Why? It adjusts for position. It is over ‘replacement player’ and not an ‘average player’, but why is it an incorrect tool to use here?
I talked about this in the post. It’s all about player pools and using intelligent baselines for comparison.
VORP, by using the players selected by the teams to DH for various reasons, drastically underestimates the actual player pool that teams are picking from. That the Twins are using Jason Tyner at DH does not mean that 7% of the players in the DH pool are no-power slap-hitters.
Or, look at it this way:
Average AL DH: .268/.355/.447
Average AL RF: .288/.359/.465
Do you really think that it’s correct to pretend that the baseline of right fielders are better hitters than the baseline of designated hitters? It’s obviously not.
VORP essentially compares DH’s to the pool of other DH’s rather than to the pool of players who could play DH (i.e. ALL players). It doesn’t make sense. It makes more sense to position adjust based on the defensive spectrum. I assume that’s why Dave has come around to the idea that position-adjust based on the defensive spectrum.
Ohhh…okay, that makes pretty good sense. Like we talked about earlier, we’re interested in strictly what players contribute offensively (from the WHOLE player pool) and then making the position difficulty adjustment. Sweet. Sorry I didn’t catch it right away, thanks for the explanation. That’s why I’m here, to learn.
Do we have any insight into what is going on with Jose Lopez. Can we write the second half of this year off because of the death in his family, or are his struggles this year indicative of a more serious issue in his game. I have always been a big Lopez fan, but I wonder if the M’s may decide to ship him off as part of a deal for more pitching. From his decrease in playing time late in the season, I really wonder about his long term future here.
131: Consider this: There are a finite number of capable hitters spread across the DH/1B/LF/RF slots. Obviously being a DH is least preferable to a player. What if most of these players were able to make themselves defensively capable enough to avoid having to be a DH, so that when spread over the four slots, there is a shortage of capable hitters even among those who cannot field? I’m just thinking that with DH being the lowest priority, there could be a smaller pool of players who can hit well but also haven’t managed to make themselves worthy of filling a defensive slot.
There’s no evidence that’s true.
I thought I’d point out that it’s absurd that 66 percent of ESPN.com readers favor the team starting Josh Fogg over the team starting Jake Peavy. I observe this as the Rockies have 1st and third with none out…
It should be taken into account the variation in defensive skill between the best and the worst at a position – I suspect the best defensive shortstop isn’t too much better than your average full-time SS (the implication being, all full time shortstops are good defenders) but the gap between, say, the best and worst left fielders might be huge.
Yeah okay…Is it just probable then that the fact that AL teams have been able to fill RF with on average better hitters than DH mean that they don’t correctly value the DH, that they use it too often to just rotate out their regulars, or that they just haven’t been looking hard enough for their own version of Jack Cust or Carlos Pena?
Most teams don’t use full-time DHs, instead using the position to rest regulars, give injured players a chance to play at less than full strength, or get something out of aging veterans who are past their prime and still under contract.
Okay, I probably need to be set straight on something here. I have a problem with the pool for DHs being the pool of all available players. While it’s true that anyone can DH, it’s also true that just about no one plays at DH except players who are very bad fielders. Most players who can field would resist like hell being put at DH, and teams know that and don’t try to force it. And it would be stupid to play a great defensive player at DH if he can play elsewhere. Ichiro can play DH, but he isn’t really part of the pool of available DHs because no team would play him there and he wouldn’t do it (apart from the occasional semi- day off).
So while baseball logic says anyone can DH, baseball reality says otherwise. The pool of available DHs is really the players who have little choice, either because they simply can’t play the field or because they are the worst fielder of the best nine hitters (to simplify).
It seems to me this is why DH so often seems to lag behind where we think it should be in hitting totals compared to other positions. So — like I said, I’m sure I’m missing something — why shouldn’t DH be judged by the average numbers, compared to other positions, over several years (not just this year)? Or is it?
I should have said, just about no one plays full time.
scraps,
I asked essentially the same question in 77/78, and Tango and Dave responded in 80/81…. I think the example was meant to simplify, so your middle paragraph is actually on the mark, within the limits of the example Dave used.
I thought I’d point out that it’s absurd that 66 percent of ESPN.com readers favor the team starting Josh Fogg over the team starting Jake Peavy. I observe this as the Rockies have 1st and third with none out…
Heart vs head. They’re voting what they want, not necessarily what they think. (Who likes the Padres?) Also, the Rockies have won 13 of their past 14; the Padres just lost two in a row with the season on the line. As good as Peavey is, he’s not a lock.
….And former-Mariner JoeJessica (aka Yorvit Torrealba), batting 8th, just hit a HR to put the Rox up 3-0.
Is there a former Mariner on the post-season roster of every team? The Yanks have ARod, the Phillies have Moyer and Dobbs, the Indians have Asdrubal Cabrera, the Padres have Cameron (though he’s not playing, but then maybe neither are the Padres), the Cubs have Lou, and the Diamondbacks have Bob; with the Red Sox, it’s just Varitek-by-way-of-Slocumb, and Ortiz if you really want to stretch.
142 – Take the sandlot scenario, and grant this would probably never work out this way. But just say that as your wittling down the list from the highest skill defensive position, it just happens to work out that starting with the 2nd best hitter you get the best hitter available at each turn that can also field the position you require to fill.
So the best 2-10 hitters are off the board, and just for arguments sake they can all field the position required fairly well. Now it turns out the best hitter is really fast, has a slick glove, but is just one tick below each guy you took before for the respective positions they are good at. Now are you going to look to the 11th best hitter because he’s a lumbering oaf and #1 would make a great shortstop compared to anyone but the guy you got? Of course not, you’re going to take the best hitter you can to fill that DH role.
Another example might be would we DH Beltre next year if we stumbled upon someone else that played a better 3rd base, probably. Does this mean Beltre is no longer able to go into a pool of available 3rd baseman, well no of course not, but it does mean he was available in the pool of DHs. In baseball reality as you talk about this is of course not at all probable, but it could happen. I guess it really comes down to the fact that these numbers are based in theory, and in theory any ballplayer COULD DH.
Pete, thanks, but it didn’t actually answer my question; Dave’s 81 says that the pool is “100 players minus the nine already chosen, or 91 of the 100″, and that’s the part I’m having trouble with, since effectively the number is far less. (Or so it seems to me.)
scraps:
I think the thing that you’re getting hung up on is that even the players that no one would realistically put at DH, still CAN be at DH; the manager or whoever just decides their talents are better used elsewhere. Thus, they are part of the potential players at that position.
Whereas not everyone in the available player pool can play defense at, say, shortstop, so they can’t be considered to be part of the available players at that position.
I hope that helps?
145, I grant your second-paragraph example for the sandlot, but it just isn’t going to work that way in the major leagues. You can’t just take the best hitter available after filling your positions and expect him to DH full time, without regard to context, particularly whether he can play defense himself.
You’re overstating the case, scraps. Gary Sheffield didn’t want to play first base for New York, so they traded him to the Tigers. Detroit gave him some more money and voila, he was totally fine DH’ing.
Ask Adam Jones if he’d have rather DH’d or sat on the bench. The player pool available to DH is, without a doubt, the largest of any pool of players. We have to take that into account.
Jeff, my head must be thick. I understand what you’re saying, but it doesn’t (to me) answer the fundamental question, which is: what is the actual, realistic size of the major league pool of available players for DH? I don’t think it’s 90 percent of all hitters, or even close. It isn’t just that the manager decides Ichiro’s talents are better used elsewhere; it’s that Ichiro knows it, we all know it, and there’s no way he’d be installed as an everyday DH.
Okay. I guess I’m just going to have to accept being wrong without really getting it. (It did occur to me, Dave, that young players like Jones would be more willing to swallow hard and accept the role.)
It is true, though, isn’t it, that the DH position generally does not have the best hitting totals, as logic would lead us to expect from the pool of available players?
That, of course, I understand.
How is the -15 number arrived at? Is it an estimate, or is it derived from something?
148 – Yeah I guess we’re talking apples to oranges here then. These #s are a very basic way of accounting for the fact there is added value in having someone that COULD do something other than DH, just because they can in fact do that additional thing.
But as you state in any scenario based in reality where you need to account for salaries, player egos, lack of talent at other positions, etc., the actual amount of players you WOULD play at DH full time becomes much smaller. So you’re point is somewhat applicable to the reality of the game. But just in assigning values I’m sure you can understand why it is more valuable to have someone that COULD DH (ie anyone) as opposed to someone that COULD DH or play C. (ie smallest group of avail players) And of course this is not looking at the actual skills of the players yet.
Well, you’re talking about something different. Let’s take Willie Bloomquist as an example, because I haven’t bashed on Willie in a while (tee hee!).
No team would realistically put Willie Bloomquist in as their everyday DH; there is always going to be a better option available as long as there’s someone else on your team that hasn’t lost both their arms to gangrene.
However, he still could potentially fill that position “defensively”, since there is no defense to play at DH, so he is part of the available pool of players at DH; by way of contrast, David Ortiz couldn’t play center field defensively (although it’d be amusing to watch him try), so he is not part of the available pool of players at that position.
It doesn’t really have anything to do with whether a player would be realistically used at a position, just whether they can fill its defensive requirements.
Mistake – Paragraph 2 in 154 should be your, not you’re
Apparently I need sleep, 154 should also say more valuable to have someone that could DH or play C as opposed to someone that can only DH
It is true, though, isn’t it, that the DH position generally does not have the best hitting totals, as logic would lead us to expect from the pool of available players?
I think the devil is in the details here. As I mentioned, a lot of teams just don’t even attempt to fill the DH spot with one player, instead using it for other purposes. If we looked at only full-time designated hitters, we’d see that they are, indeed, the best hitters of any position.
Because the position offers unique advantages in terms of creativity, adjusting back to a league average of players chosen by the teams won’t give us a realistic assessment of the available options. Remember, Reggie Willits DH’d 14 times this year.
As for the -15 run number, there’s no rock solid math behind it, so you can move it to -13 or -14 if you want. But, there’s no way to argue that it can be higher than -11, as the penalty has to be higher than that of playing first base, and I’d argue that a 1 or 2 run penalty isn’t stiff enough. If you think its 3 or 4 runs, thats fine – you may be right, and I’m okay with it being -13 or -14 or -15. The idea is still the same.
As you’ve probably noticed, I’m not trying to do super precise work here. I’m not handing out MVPs based on the differences between fractions of a run with this tool. For the purposes we’re using it for, the conclusions we’re drawing won’t change.
Thanks.
If Ortiz is a -10 fielder at 1B relative to all 1B, and he gets the -10 1B penalty, if you move him to DH, shouldn’t he get something close to a -20 penalty? That’s WHY he is a DH, because his fielding is below the -10 acceptable level.
(It comes out to -15 instead of -20, because it’s harder to DH. You give them a +5 more “hitting off the bench” runs, so that the overall penalty is -15.)
***
If this was high school, your best fielders are at SS, CF, maybe 3B and LF. Now, if you were to compare to the average player at each position, the average SS = average 2B = average DH. But, that’s ludicrous isn’t it? If every team’s best player is at SS or CF, how can you then rate the average SS as being equal to the average CF?
The average QB is not equal to the average OT is he?
That’s the point. You have to approach this from reality. And the reality is that not every position is necessarily equal, even if you need to have someone man each position.
Did you know that in the early50s that the offensive output of the CF was HIGHER than 1B? Would any sane person conclude that the average 1B at that time was equal to the average CF? Clearly the average CF is a better fielder than the average 1B. If he’s also a better hitter, then the average CF at that time must have been better than the average 1B.
Approach this from a reality perspective, not from a “let me fit everything into a nice matrix” perspective. Mathematical gymnastics we don’t need.
“then rate the average SS as being equal to the average CF?” should say
“then rate the average SS as being equal to the average 2B?”
If we looked at only full-time designated hitters, we’d see that they are, indeed, the best hitters of any position.
That’s pretty easily done. Cumulative line for all DHs this year who qualified for the batting title: .285/.390/.487.
That group includes Ortiz, Vidro, Thomas, Thome, Hafner, Sheffield, Cust, and Huff. I included the latter two because they played DH more frequently than they played any position in the field, and consistent with the interpretation, they drag the averages down. Notable full-time DHs who did not qualify: Piazza (injury, shared time with Cust) and Sosa.
Still, that wouldn’t necessarily be the case every year.
As well, if you only look at the top 8 DH in playing time, you need to look at the top 8 at each position to make the comparison fair.
Here’s a couple of therads that you might find interesting:
http://www.insidethebook.com/ee/index.php/site/comments/defense_spectrum/
http://www.insidethebook.com/ee/index.php/site/comments/replacement_level_fielding/
Dave, you’re saying that because of the filtering you describe in comment 45, it doesn’t make sense to normalize, for example, SS and 2B to the same baseline, since the SS pool is more restricted. Yet in the original post you mention that in 2007 the offensive numbers were about the same for SS and 2B. Was 2007 just a fluke in that regard? If there are offensive differences between positions or groups of positions, normalizing to the position-specific or group-specific averages themselves should be okay, rather than doing a more manual weighting of +5, -5, etc.
Also, this normalizing scheme does seem to be injecting defensive considerations into an offensive measure, which I’m not sure is necessary. It’s basically adding a caveat related to defense, saying “yes, players of position X have lower offensive numbers than position Y, but that’s because they have stricter criteria for defense at that position.” Why not keep offensive and defensive stats separate and have the player’s overall value determined by the combination? I see the point of your normalization, I’m just not sure it’s necessary for an offensive stat.
It doesn’t have to be necessary for an offensive stat. In fact, you don’t want to do it.
However, if you are trying to “describe” something, you want the positional adjustment, since the reader will be thinking it anyway. Jeter’s offense is highly regarded because he is a SS, and wouldn’t be so highly regarded if he was a LF.
In any case, you want all three components (offense, defense, position). Part of the confusion seems to be that Dave only presented two of the three here.
“normalizing to the position-specific or group-specific averages themselves should be okay”… as long as you don’t just use a 1-yr average. It’s nonsensical to think that the average RF = average DH, if we know that the RF hit better and fields better. Same with saying SS = 2B. (Over the long haul, the average 2B will hit better than the average SS.)