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The Cheater's Guide to Baseball
"Derek Zumsteg should be ashamed to have such comprehensive knowledge of the history of cheating in baseball. Pete Rose gave me two to one odds this book would become a classic." -- Allen Barra, author of The Last Coach: A Life of Paul "Bear" Bryant
The Seeds of Success
The four teams in the League Championship Series have been set - Cleveland vs Boston, Arizona vs Colorado. If every postseason tells a story, then so far, the story of 2007 is the dominance of the new school of baseball executives.
Theo Epstein is 33 years old. Josh Byrnes is 37 years old. Mark Shapiro is 39 years old. Dan O’Dowd is the old man in the room, coming in at 47 years old. All of them are running the team that gave them their first chance to be a general manager. None of them played an inning of major league baseball. And they all came from the same tree.
In 1998, John Hart was the General Manager of the Cleveland Indians, who were winning another division title in the middle of a mini-dynasty. His Assistant General Manger was a man named Dan O’Dowd, who had worked his way up through the ranks beginning in 1988. The Assistant Director of Scouting was Josh Byrnes. And the current Cleveland GM, Mark Shapiro, was the Director of Minor League Operations that year.
John Hart had three of the four GMs in the 2007 LCS working for him in the same front office that year. It gets better. When Dan O’Dowd was hired by the Colorado Rockies in 2000 to be their GM, he took Josh Byrnes with him, giving him an Assistant General Manager role. Byrnes stayed in that job for three years before taking an Asst. GM job with the Boston Red Sox, working for Theo Epstein - the GM of the other team alive in the 2007 LCS. After several years in Boston, the Arizona Diamondbacks handed him the reins of their organization.
Byrnes worked with Shapiro and O’Dowd, then for O’Dowd, and then for Epstein. These four organizations are all intertwined by the people who they have put in charge in the last decade. And they all have one singular goal in common - to gather as much information as possible and put it to use in the best possible ways in order to win baseball games. Cleveland, Arizona, Colorado, and Boston aren’t true “Moneyball” organizations - they’re Moneyball 2.0 clubs, the ones who have successfully integrated both scouting and statistical analysis into a cohesive organization and are leveraging every good piece of information they can find into a competitive advantage.
These are the organizations who won’t settle for time honored traditions. They won’t settle for doing things the way they’ve always been done. They question conventional wisdom and they look for empirical answers. They hire the smartest people they can find and let experience take a back seat to talent.
And they win baseball games.
This isn’t stats vs scouts - this is stats and scouts working together, building an organization that blends the best of both worlds. This is the blueprint for how a baseball organization should be run. And, whether the baseball men of the 20th century like it or not, this is where baseball is going. The John Hart family tree has branched out even beyond the Billy Beane family tree - the Pirates just hired Neil Huntington from the Indians, and Shapiro’s right hand man, Chris Antonetti, can essentially pick whatever job he wants whenever he decides to run a franchise. With Andrew Friedman as something of a second cousin down in Tampa along with Kevin Towers and Doug Melvin as the crazy uncles over in San Diego and Milwaukee, this is no longer a cute theory about how the Oakland A’s are winning with a small payroll. This is the 21st century of baseball management.
If you’re rooting for an organization that isn’t adapting to the changing face of how baseball teams are run (and if you’re reading this blog, you probably are), expect 2007 to be the norm. The good organizations are going to win a lot of baseball games, and the people who rely on analysis that was handed down to them from 1970s will sit at home in October, wondering which free agent pitcher they can overpay to try to save their jobs.
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AMEN BROTHER!!
I was sitting watching the Indians dismantling of the Yankees and thinking how “vibrant” their team seems. Young players with talent and not too many overpriced, over-the-hill, free agents on the team. They keep the profile of the team turning with new, young, inexpensive talent. Even though I hadn’t watched much of the Indians through the year, I couldn’t help but think “This is a team I would want to follow!”
I don’t want players to be the “face” of the organization. I want the “team” to be the face of the organization. I think too many people have gotten caught up in the ESPN era of big names and highlights and forgotten that what a true baseball fan REALLY wants is a winner!
Well there’s really no point in wishing for things you can’t have, so which free agent pitcher SHOULD we sign?
Oh shit.
Great back round story Dave. If these teams come in to a few years of divisions and wild cards I hope the M’s see the light sooner then later.
That’s why I say if the M’s FO and ownership wanted to show me a step toward truly wanting to win and contend for the playoffs and even play in the post season with success.
The first move would have been to fire Bill Bavasi as GM not retain him.
They would have then considered hiring one of your new 21st century GMs of the suggested group I support the hiring of Chris Antonetti.
He’s the one who can salvage the M’s in house talent machine,make smart gambles in FA/trades,and
know when to trade a player while his value nets equal and/or better value in return.
Dave–Tony Gwynn was chatting about the Indians players using tape of previous at bats during the game.
Wasn’t this pointed out by you earlier in the season? That Cleveland utilizes tape and technology better than all other organizations. Do they actually have Ipods to watch their previous at bats?
Is it my imagination or do the Cleveland players on defense seem to always been in the right place to field balls? It seems the SS and 2nd baseman move very little to field balls.
“and Shapiro’s right hand man, Chris Antonetti, can essentially pick whatever job he wants whenever he decides to run a franchise.”
Well, except the Mariners’ GM job, that is . . .
I was expecting this post as I watched the old guard teams fall away. I took delight in watching Frank Thomas and Cal Ripkin puzzle at how these teams with no experience dismantled teams with all the right conventional pieces. I smiled with glee as they turned toward “hot streaks” and “bad baseball at the wrong time” for why the “favorites” lost. Little was said about the winning teams save for a few comments about youth, and not always so positively. I relished the thought of this post Dave, because of the reasons you mention.
Sure, O’Dowd is not in the category of Epstein or Beane, but he’s thought outside the box for sometime, and he really does believe in mixing smarts with baseball institutional knowledge. Hart had it right with wanting Shapiro to become close with the “baseball guys” in the traditional sense so his ideas would sell, and he’d come in with credibility. But that took some guts in the face of an overwhelming number of traditionalists running organizations.
It’s not a risk anymore, M’s, to start thinking like a modern franchise. Pretty soon, failure to do so will be negligence, and the result will be ever greater failure and a continually skyrocketing payroll.
O’Dowd did experience first-hand how giving huge contracts to free agent pitchers can cripple a franchise (Hampton and Neagle).
Great article Dave. It’s truly amazing how connected those teams are. I had absolutely no idea so that’s for pointing that out.
Dave, while it’s always been clear that you’re a strong writer, this is just pure poetry.
I’m sorry, but I was once a typesetter, and I freak at certain typos: “the Arizona Diamondbacks handed him the reigns of their organization.”
It’s “reins”.
On another note, was it my imagination or did pretty much every commentator on TBS yak inordinately about “post-season experience”? Is there any reason at all (especially as of October 9, 2007) to suggest that this has any meaning?
These are the organizations who won’t settle for time honored traditions. They won’t settle for doing things the way they’ve always been done. They question conventional wisdom and they look for empirical answers. They hire the smartest people they can find and let experience take a back seat to talent.
…
This is the 21st century of baseball management.
And I’m completely baffled as to why, specifically, Howard Lincoln who helped build a company that is essentially a computer/software company — i.e. a company that very much is a 21st century company — hasn’t quite caught on to this concept.
The campaign really shouldn’t be “Free Chris Antonetti!” — the campaign SHOULD be “Free Chris Larson!”
Sure…to fill air time.
Seriously, it MIGHT make a difference when all thing are equal….but the traditionalists are thinking that it’s an equivalent trait to talent—and I don’t think that’s the case. You’d want experience ON TOP OF talent, not INSTEAD OF talent…
I’m not sure Nintendo would count as a 21st Century company. I think it’s still run along the lines of a traditional Japanese corporation (which has its advantages)…I wouldn’t sat it’s anywhere as dominating as it once was.
11- Of course it has meaning. When the phrase is used it means you don’t know what you are talking about and just filling air time. Example, “Jeter is great in these situations with his post-season experience!”
“After the double play the Yankees threat ends once again.” Confusion around the studio as they wonder why the great Yankees are losing to the Indians.
“And here come the Yankees!” Someone got a hit. Ooops. Double play.
“And here come the Yankees!” ditto
I can’t wait to see Kyle Lohse save the Mariners! It would almost be funny if it weren’t so sad.
Dave, with the Pirates getting Huntington to run their organization about how long until they are competitive? How long does it take to turn a franchise around?
Also would the Mariners have a shorter turn around time with the money and scouting they have available?
Even the Angels, while not a saber team, has had great success scouting young talent, and replacing over-priced veteran talent, with low cost, high upside replacements. I think as more and more old-school GM’s get the boot, you’ll see most of the establishment replaced. There’ll be hold-outs, and unfortunately I have the awful gut-wrenching feeling, the M’s will be one of them, at least for a little while.
7: And yet it’s interesting that as an “analyst”, Frank Thomas hasn’t figured this out — considering that his employers from the past two seasons (A’s, Jays) also both subscribe to this new school of organizational management.
Speaking of the Jays, what’s their problem?
Good story about O’Dowd and the Rockies’ player development.
Um, no URL tag? Here’s URL: http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/mlb/article/0,2777,DRMN_23924_5717214,00.html
21- The had a lot of injuries and they play in the AL east. Those are the simple answers, but really I think they were a few injuries away from being an 85 win team. That middle infield is a joy to watch, I hope they keep it together for awhile.
it’s interesting that as an “analyst”, Frank Thomas hasn’t figured this out
I can’t watch Frank Thomas. Surely someone at TBS could find him a suit that fits.
24: Since Carlos G. is rumored to be moving to 1B next year, I wonder if the Tigers are now sorry that they gave up on John McDonald so soon?
Well written, Dave. We can only hope Lincoln or Armstrong read it.
Howie or Chuckie reading anything which runs contra to the old-fashioned way they do things? Surely we should jest…
That Cleveland utilizes tape and technology better than all other organizations. Do they actually have Ipods to watch their previous at bats?
All the teams use video, and some of the players were ahead of the curve with video ipods or even earlier — back in 2001 Schilling was paying a guy to compile tapes of every batter he was due to face in the coming week and send them to him on DVD, so he could watch them on his laptop. Most teams have institutionalized this practice by now, I believe, though some are probably better at it than others. What Dave has alluded to is not data technology in use by the players, but by the front office: the Indians apparently have a system for tracking as much information as they can gather — from stats and scounts — about every player and then actually use that information to make (gasp) informed decisions about about trades and hires.
I’m not sure Nintendo would count as a 21st Century company. I think it’s still run along the lines of a traditional Japanese corporation (which has its advantages)…I wouldn’t sat it’s anywhere as dominating as it once was.
Actually, they completely own the handheld market and they’re kicking ass in the next-gen console wars despite being the last to market — and they did that by not falling into the trap of building an expensive system that would take a long time to pay off, but by building something cheap that offered entertaining gameplay thanks to innovative controllers and smart design. Sound familiar? No, I can’t explain why the Cleveland model is good enough for the Wii but not for their baseball team.
Speaking of the Jays, what’s their problem?
This year? Same problem as the A’s, just with a bigger payroll (which, relative to their division, doesn’t give them any advantages).
Well written, Dave. We can only hope Lincoln or Armstrong read it.
Why? They don’t understand the argument Dave is making. They are set in their own ways, and because they’ve had success in the past, they won’t see the need to change their approach.
They’ll probably label Epstein, Byrnes, O’Dowd, and Shapiro as flashes in the pan and go back to work on an extension for Bavasi.
Why? They don’t understand the argument Dave is making. They are set in their own ways, and because they’ve had success in the past, they won’t see the need to change their approach.
They’re intelligent businessmen; they’d understand Dave’s point.
They just wouldn’t care. Look at those attendance figures in Derek’s Rebuilding post. That’s how they measure success, entirely unlike how Dave’s doing it.
Hm. I thought that was AFTER Lincoln “retired” to run the Mariners. I had the distinct impression that Ninentendo stagnated a bit on his watch (on the other hand, I don’t follow the gaming industry that well….so I could very well be mistaken…)
Oh, that’s just crap. They know darn well that success is keyed off of a winning baseball team. And winning means getting into the playoffs.
If you ever read the quotes from Armstrong and Lincoln on how to build teams and what makes good baseball, it’s clear they’re stuck in the mid-20th Century….
With regard to the whole, Lincoln used to run Nintendo, he should know how to run 21st century organizations thing:
I work in the software industry, I’ve worked for Nintendo’s direct competitors and have friends who work for Nintendo. They don’t run their company like a 21st century company. The way the Mariners are run is pretty in line with this.
They put on a good face, put out a shiny consumer friendly, family friendly product, but they run on tradition and needlessly complex and outdated models.
Come on everyone, get a grip. Of course playoff experience counts. The Diamondbacks, Rockies and Red Sox just experienced the joy of sweeping their first round opponent. Also, the Indians just experienced sending the Yankees packing in Yankee Stadium. That is the kind of playoff experience that truly matters.
27/30/31 - You assume Lincoln and Armstrong know how to access the internet. I’m not so sure.
They’ll probably label Epstein, Byrnes, O’Dowd, and Shapiro as flashes in the pan and go back to work on an extension for Bavasi.
I wouldn’t give you better than 50-50 odds that Bavasi is here on October 9, 2008. Like it or not, the M’s were a significantly flawed .500 team that got lucky, as opposed to last year, where they didn’t (but the pythag records for BOTH 2006 and 2007 were nearly identical- 2006 projects to 78-84, 2007 projects to 79-83)- but Bavasi is likely to operate on the assumption that the 2007 roster was improved over 2008, and needs less work. Well, it does need some significant rework- but it’s unlikely to get it.
I think there is a pretty decent chance that we are sitting here at this time in 2008 with Bavasi and Mac gone and after a quite disappointing season… and then, maybe, we’ll be hiring someone who used to work for John Hart.
Interesting post Dave, and some great comments. Check out the main A’s Blog, Athletic Nation, for a discussion about how the folks there think Billy Beane is going to rebuild the A’s.
The A’s fans complain that they have bloated contracts for three of their players, Chavez, Kotsay, and Crosby that are tying up twenty million. So how much do the M’s have tied up in Sexton, Vidro, & Washburne?
Do you think that Shapiro, Beane, or Epstein would pay Guillen Ten Million a year for three years?
Oh, and great post. Though it does kind of make me want to cry.
Thanks, Dave, nice article. And thanks to the time I’ve spent at this site, I could see this back story as it developed during the stretch run and the playoffs.
Your references to “the new school of baseball executives” and “21st century of baseball management” bring to mind a comment one I heard one of the TBS guys make about COL and ARI: “These teams did it the old-fashioned way, by bringing a team up through their farm system.” It is an interesting perspective, and not at all untrue.
Great teams in the days of the reserve clause were built the same way. Baseball fans at that time also were more aware of young players working their way through the farm system. Yes, statistical analysis is an important new tool, but building teams this way isn’t as new as you might think.
gwangung, “stuck in the mid-20th century,” how ironic.
re: 31 & 33,
I read two articles today that added a lot to my understanding of the Mariners’ financial situation and attitude towards maintaing it. They’re a couple years old, but I doubt much (if anything) has changed.
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=81
http://members.forbes.com/global/2005/0425/036.html
I think they show that while the Mariners would like to win, they don’t really need to. And things like ‘creating an identity’ (read: give the franchise a recognizable “face”) are just as important.
I just bought the authors a refreshing beer, but it went to derek@ussmariner.com, not Dave. Derek, let Dave have a friggin’ beer, for cryin’ out loud!
Too bad John Hart himself is apparently locked up with the Rangers. As a talent spotter — exec talent, not just players — we could use him!
Somebody at Nintendo must have their hard screwed on straight to have embraced the Wii and the DS. Both broke significantly from the mold and trends in the gaming industry and both have paid off in spades. While the both were significant departures from what MS & Sony were doing, they also played right into the strengths of Nintendo.
Unfortunately I doubt it had anything to do with Nintendo of America. Let’s not forget that this crew did not run Nintendo but instead ran NoA which mostly markets what NoJ puts out and provides technical support.
It’s better to be lucky than good, but it’s even better to be both lucky and good. All the teams in the LCS were both fortunate and good. Series sweeps in a 5 game series in baseball do not show dominance over the opponent. A few breaks going the other direction and all 4 series could still be in contention.
Dave doesn’t drink beer.
oh, Dave doesn’t drink– he is probably giving his beers to Derek in a characteristically altruistic fashion
part of the problem is that his height is all in his legs, so he looks oddly short seated between Cal & Ernie.
I’m not sure what it says about the TBS post-game show, but I did find Ernie’s laying out the physical comparisons between Big Frank and fellow Auburn grad Charles Barkley to be entertaining …
Awesome post. You guys just got beered.
Well, give him some Red Bull or grape Kool-aid or soy milk latte or whatever the heck he wants. Writing articles this good is thirsty work, or so I imagine.
Well said and I agree 100%. I can’t wait for us to bring back Freddy Garcia at $10+ per year.
On another note, who’s been editing the wikipedia entry for Bavasi:
At the beginning of 2007, Howard Lincoln, the Mariners CEO, said Bavasi was on the “hot seat” unless he produced a championship contender. To prepare for the 2007 searon, Bavasi traded away young talent for veterans on the downsides of their careers. The team appeared to be in contention until a late season collapse (echoing Mariners’ collapses of the previous three years) dropped the Mariners from playoff contention. Nonetheless, CEO Lincoln announced that Bavasi would be brought back in 2008 because he had produced a winning record in 2007. Many fans believe this portends more mediocrity in the future.
Um, that should have been $10 million, not $10. For the record I would support a $10 a year contract for Freddy.
“If you’re rooting for an organization that isn’t adapting to the changing face of how baseball teams are run (and if you’re reading this blog, you probably are)”
Yep. I’m a Cubs fan. The team just traded young, cheap talent for 3 starts from Steve Trachsel. Beauty, eh. Unless they can afford to pour $300 million/year into their product every year, I’ll speculate that Hendry’s days are numbered…
We should buy Dave Cameron a refreshing:
http://www.amazon.com/Canon-24-70mm-2-8L-Standard-Cameras/dp/B00009R6WT/ref=s9_js_pop_title/105-8880282-6774010?ie=UTF8&pf%5Frd%5Ft=101&pf%5Frd%5Fm=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf%5Frd%5Fp=278240701&pf%5Frd%5Fs=center-1&pf%5Frd%5Fr=073GB68ZCD3MA2H9TN2D&pf%5Frd%5Fi=507846
We should buy Dave Cameron a refreshing:
http://www.amazon.com/Canon-24-70mm-2-8L-Standard-Cameras/dp/B00009R6W
Now what good would that do him???
This one would fit his camera better…
Of course, with the lens arsenal he has right now, he’d probably do better with this…
I’m sure there are other worthy causes, too…
One of the very odd things about some of the resistance to applying at least some analysis along with scouting in the running of a team is that it often differs only in degree rather than kind from what’s been done before.
The perfect example, to me, a Red Sox fan, is the attitude of one of the boston writers, the hated Dan Shaughnessy of the Globe. (Trust me, he’s mostly reviled in new england). Shaughnessy was contemptuous of the Sox hiring Bill James and such a young GM as Theo Epstein. He ridiculed the idea of using analysis to run an organization. But, in addition to these bile filled columns, he wrote one about the Orioles of Earl Weaver. It seemed Shaughnessy had worked for a DC or Baltimore paper in the late 70’s and got to know Weaver a bit. He apparently liked Weaver and marveled at his great knowledge of the game. But he told how Weaver was so competitive that he was one of the first to record matchup data on 3×5 cards. Shaughnessy recounted how, at a crucial moment in the 1979 ALCS, someone came running down to the dugout to give Earl the info that there was an Oriole who’d hit well against the new Angels reliever, Montague (no, not Capulet). John Lowenstein had hit him well. Weaver put in Lowenstein who got a big hit.
What was amazing and kind of sad was that Shaughnessy couldn’t see that major league equivalent stats for minor leaguers or whatever analysis tool James, Epstein and the Sox were using were just the next step past the 3×5 card. Why was the level of sophistication of the 3×5 card some magical stopping line? Simply because that’s what Shaughnessy was familar with, I think.
Why was the level of sophistication of the 3×5 card some magical stopping line? Simply because that’s what Shaughnessy was familar with, I think.
That seems like a perfectly reasonable explanation. In many walks of life, stubborn people exist that reach the conclusion “well, if it was good enough back in my day, it should be good enough today,” and they stop adapting new and useful innovations.
Unsuprisingly, these people tend to wind up in the rearview mirror of the folks who adapt and change as new technology/information becomes available.
Ya know, I hate to conjur up this tired ghost again BUT I just looked up the ages of the 1995 team, arguably the best in team history (including the 2001 squad). I count 15 over 30, three at 30 and the rest younger than 30. That team was so refreshing to watch because of their enthusiasm (and talent) and you knew THEY WERE GOING TO BE AROUND FOR SEVERAL YEARS. Where did the organization get off the track? Now we’re focused on “experience” and trying to sign washed up pitchers and backup fielders and it’s just depressing.
Ayala — 26
Belcher — 34
Benes — 28
Bosio — 32
Carmona — 23
Charlton — 32
Converse — 24
Cummings — 26
Davis — 25
Davison — 25
Fleming — 26
Frey — 32
Guetterman — 37
Harikkala — 24
Johnson — 32
King — 26
Krueger — 37
Mecir — 25
Nelson — 29
Risley — 28
Torres — 23
Villone — 25
Wells — 29
Wolcott — 22
Kreuter — 31
Widger — 24
Wilson — 26
Blowers — 30
Cora –30
Fermin –32
T. Martinez — 28
Pirkl — 25
A-Rod — 20
Sojo — 30
Strange — 31
Amaral — 33
Bragg — 26
Buhner –31
Coleman — 34
Diaz — 27
Griffey — 26
Newfield — 23
Newson — 31
Thurman — 31
Edgar — 32
This was an informative and provocative piece. This is why I read this forum. Though I still believe in “chemistry” and “clutch,” I appreciate reading that which makes me think about what I thought I knew. Thanks!
And this one just from memory, but in addition to the young 2007 Cleveland Indians, I seem to remember:
The 2004 Tigers I think it was, lost about 120 games and two years (and a lot of young players later) were in the ALCS.
The 1997 Marlins conducted a fire sale after winning the World Series, then won it again with another crop of young players in 2003.
The same might be said for the 2001 Diamondbacks and 2007 Diamondbacks as well.
‘heavy sigh’
59- Tigers were in the World Series and a PFP away from winning the thing.
You do bring up a good point of when a team rebuilds and has a plan in a few years they are there at the top competing. You rarely see the teams that try and reload with expensive free agents up there at the top, unless its the Yankees.
60 -
And even the Yankees are having second thoughts…
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/playoffs2007/columns/story?columnist=bryant_howard&id=3055250
“Yankees general manager Brian Cashman has over the past few months grown even more convinced that the big-money, heavy-spending Yankees way needs to die a quick death, an attitude supported by the ebullient play of Melky Cabrera, Robinson Cano, Joba Chamberlain, Phil Hughes and a host of young players saddled, but not for long, behind the Yankees’ ballast.”
If you ever read the quotes from Armstrong and Lincoln on how to build teams and what makes good baseball, it’s clear they’re stuck in the mid-20th Century….
No, it’s clear they think their audience is stuck in the mid-20th Century, and they’re right.
One of the very odd things about some of the resistance to applying at least some analysis along with scouting in the running of a team is that it often differs only in degree rather than kind from what’s been done before.
So very true. The Mariners, for instance, will happily use ERA, AVE and RBIs to evaluate players. Which is better than using, oh, blood type and astrological sign, or anecdotal evidence (coupled with its first cousin, selective memory). But it’s really not a conceptual leap from there to xFIP, OPS and some kind of runs metric. The hurdle, I think, is that ERA, AVE and RBIs have been around a while (you might say they’re, ahem, “proven veterans”) and every manger (General or Field) has known how to calculate them since they were twelve years old. The new “kids” (xFIP, OPS+, etc.) are unfamiliar, and many are predicated on the debunking of some cherished beliefs (e.g. xFIP replaces ERA because “clutch pitching” – stranding runners – is a myth and defense and luck matter more than pitcher’s skill for BABIP). Something that a manager doesn’t understand and goes against what he already “knows” is tough to accept.
And we should remember, some of these “rookie” statistics are not Major League quality players. OBI%, for instance. So skepticism is called for. The real skill that the John Hart “tree” has in this (statistical analysis), I think, is what Dave called stats and scouts working together – the ability to see how a bunch of numbers relate to traditional evaluation techniques, and let the two inform one another. In fact, you could make the argument that one of the 2007 M’s biggest mistakes was due to using stats at the expense of traditional scouting. Really traditional scouting puts a lot of emphasis on a player’s defensive ability (throwing and fielding are 40% of the “five tools”), but the M’s overlooked that in favor of RBIs to play Ibanez instead of Jones in LF.
Or maybe they just use whatever excuse is handy to justify doing what they wanted to do in the first place. That’s the other trap of statistics. If you’re not particular, you can usually find something that says what you wanted to hear. I think the Indians have been good at avoiding that mistake.
63 - “In fact, you could make the argument that one of the 2007 M’s biggest mistakes was due to using stats at the expense of traditional scouting. Really traditional scouting puts a lot of emphasis on a player’s defensive ability (throwing and fielding are 40% of the “five tools”), but the M’s overlooked that in favor of RBIs to play Ibanez instead of Jones in LF.”
I see your point, and agree with most of your post, but I don’t think you really could make that specific argument.
Because, in this case, 2 out of 5 really doesn’t equal anywhere near 40%.
And RBI, while a number, isn’t really a “stat” in the sense that you mean it. It fits better in the “traditional” category.
I only point this out so we don’t hear that argument on the radio tomorrow.
Speaking of the Yanks, they keep waffling on whether to keep or ditch Torre. I wonder how much of his leaving will impact whether Mariano Rivera, Jorge Posada, and others stay with the Yankees or end up elsewhere. I doubt it’ll have any impact on A-Rod, but some of these other guys have known Joe their entire careers and players DO have some semblence of loyalty for their managers.
I think Torre staying or going will be the beginning of any Yankee transformation in spending philosophy. Honestly, though, even if the organization changes it’s habits to become a modern analytical empire, it wont change it’s unlimited resource capability. Hell, it’s not as if their major money acquisitions haven’t been productive players; Carl Pavano nonwithstanding.
I’m unclear what the point of including the GM ages is, other than to imply/assert that it would be utterly impossible to find a suitable GM over the age of, oh, 50, who would be able to successfully combine stats and scouting.
These guys learned at the feet of John Hart, who learned from somebody else (or a combination of somebody else’s which is really how we all learn). It’d be interesting to dig a little deeper into that tree and see where the other limbs landed.
I imagine it depends on who they bring in– if it is Mattingly, he prob. has enough True Yankee luster to carry them with him
anyone remember how Lach is, as a 3B coach?
But…. But Bavasi is from the Angels!!!
I recognize any prediction of where the economics of baseball will go in the next 5 to 10 years is merely a guess….But, it would seem in todays market of high revenue and smarter GM’s would lead to a more balanced FA market.
Basically, what i’m wondering is could GM’s spending wiser lead to an end to crazy contracts given to fringe #5 starters? I recognize there are always going to be teams out there that are willing to pay ten times more for a ‘veteran’ to get a perfomance they could of gotten from a AAA starter, but it would seem the law of supply and demand would help curb the Gil Meche type contracts.
But as i write this i think about the good ol’ boys in SEA, SF, CHI that are always going to have money to burn.
I don’t think the ages are provided as any sort of “assertion”.
I think it’s just a way to show that it’s the younger GMs who are at the forefront of changing the way smart teams evaluate and utilize talent.
While it would probably be more DIFFICULT to find an older GM who is prepared to get on board with the ideas these GMs are using to help their teams be successful, I don’t think anyone’s saying it’s impossible.
Which one of those hired Bob Melvin? He was bad in Seattle and good now, maybe.
Excellent post, as usual, Dave.
My reaction to this, especially read in conjunction with Derek’s also excellent post before it, is that a lot of the vitriol we’ve aimed at Lincoln and Armstrong is misplaced. I’ve certainly been guilty of that, at various, exasperating points in Mariners history, but it seems to me that the business side of the Mariners is a virtually unqualified success, and much of the credit for that belongs to Armstrong and Lincoln.
The problem is that these businessmen know less about how to run the baseball side of things than they think they do, or the business side is far too often allowed to interfere with the baseball side (or both, really). That said, it could be little more than an accident that we end up with a GM with old-school philosophy and methods, because those in charge don’t really know the baseball side as well as they think they do. Their hires seem much more about relationships, and the prospective hire’s willingness to work within theie business model than any real embrace of “old school” or “new school” methods of running baseball operations.
The Lincoln/Amstrong way of doing business has been successful, but it is not the only way to run a successful business. When the business side begins to change, and someone comes around with a more open approach to letting the business side adapt to what is successful from a baseball perspective, rather than the other way around, well . . . THEN we’ll be happier fans.
re 73
That’s my view. But that ire isn’t that misplaced, when
a) the business people think they know more about baseball than they really do,
b) their business practices interfere with the baseball side, and
c) good business practices really DON’T interfere with good baseball practices (it’s that THEIR business practices interfere with good baseball practices).
Having Bavasi, or Armstrong, or even Lincoln read this post is not going to do any good. As obtuse as that trio is, it is inconceivable that they are not fully aware of the personnel running the franchises still in contention. On some level, even Lincoln realizes that he now looks like a complete tool for that “Cleveland-style rebuilding” remark. But like the rest of the Flat Earth Society, he has an amazing ability to dismiss the convergence of a certain philosophy into the upper tier as an anomaly.
Can someone please translate this post into Japanese and put together a sophisticated sales presentation, replete with bar graphs, etc.? The pitch goes something like this: “Look, we don’t care if you never come to a game. We realize that this franchise is a cash cow and winning is secondary. But you can make EVEN MORE MONEY with less overhead by fielding a winning team.”
IMO, Lincoln is the de facto GM and has been for years. Until he is replaced, nothing meaningful regarding the way this team is built is likely to change. If Dave/Derek has a post about the relative autonomy of Bavasi, GIllick, et al in the Lincoln era, I’d be obliged if someone could point me to it.
As mentioned atleast 50 times before, great article Dave! Lincoln should feel stupid now how he was rejecting a cleveland style rebuild, now that Shapiro is starting to enjoy the fruits of his labor.
It seems like Epstein, O’Dowd, and etc. do provide the best analysis of baseball, and I also noticed that Dave and Derek also use scouting and stats to know who the best players are and what the best decisions are. Unfortunately, Dave or Derek don’t really have any power to make any of those decisions, which why the Mariners are the way they are.
Its too bad that they couldn’t get rid of Bavasi, even after that horrendous September. I was hoping he’d be replaced by Antonetti, someone who has had hands on experience with this style of GM which seems to work really well.
But as said before, it seems Lincoln’s goal isn’t to win, it’s to get butts into the stadium seats and to sell merchandise. Being CEO of a big corperation, I am sure he has more of a business mindset than a baseball one to make as much money as possible. And they have played all the right cards for that goal. (Having a really nice stadium, and having Ichiro as their marketable superstar, and etc.) Unfortunately, that doesn’t seem to work as far as winning goes.
Any way there can be a cou’ de’ taut, or atleast a strike until the franchise starts reorganizing itself?
No, no, no…that’s totally wrong. He wants to win.
It’s just that he thinks
a) it’s too risky to tear down and rebuild, from a baseball standpoint, and/or
b) the overall revenue from tear-down/rebuild won’t equal the overall revenue from the path they were taking. (I.e., they will take a major hit from attendance from a teardown, but only a modest hit from the path they took).
I think they’re wrong, from both a business and a baseball perspective, but never think that they don’t want to win. They’re BUSINESSMEN. I don’t know any successful businessmen who don’t want to win.
Look, it’s pretty simple. The narrative the management team’s operating under is “Well, we got old after 2003, but Bill’s done his job in drafting good young kids and improving the major league roster- just look! We’ve gone from 63 to 69 to 78 to 88 wins! So Bill’s approach MUST be working!” It’s the same sort of results-oriented analysis that gave us Jarrod Washburn (”Hey! Look at his ERA!”) and so on.
And to be blunt, this team and farm system ARE in better positions than they were in 2004, and Bavasi DOES deserve some credit for it. This does not excuse the numerous mistakes or mean his strategies are optimal, but…
The 1997 Marlins conducted a fire sale after winning the World Series, then won it again with another crop of young players in 2003.
If you are going to seriously argue that the sabremetric community considered the 2003 Marlins as a good way to build a franchise ala the Indians, I’m going to have to ask you to back that up with contemporaneous commentary. I remember reading Baseball Prospectus and so on, and EVERYONE ripped Marlins management for things like signing Pudge, basically saying “WTF are they THINKING?!?!?!?” In fact, I’d argue the 2002 Angels, 2003 Marlins, and 2005 White Sox are better examples of “even blind pigs find acorns”, and the idea that the non-repeatable skills in baseball (aka luck) can sometimes swamp solid franchise management than of good franchise management- consider that the 2005 Indians were aced out of the playoffs that year with a 90 win team, and went under .500 in 2006 with a pythag of a 90 win team, even though in hindsight it’s VERY clear which franchise was in superior longterm position…
In that sense, yes, Bill Bavasi could draw to an inside straight this offseason and postseason, and we could be hoisting a trophy in October 2008, despite all these smarter GMs with better strategies. It’s not a really hard scenario to project- basically, Jarrod Washburn needs a lucky year again (or Batista or whoever), Felix turns into the monster we know he’s capable of being, and Adam Jones flashes his potential + much of what happened this year, and we’re off to the races.
Anyways, getting back to the Mariner mindset, what’s going to have to happen to shake that belief is the team has to fall flat on their face, again. I don’t see Lincoln and Armstrong reacting too well to spending $106 million and seeing the team go from 88 wins to back down under .500, which is ALSO a definite possibility if the wrong things happen (for instance, losing Ichiro, Felix, Beltre or Yuni for a long portion of the season would really cripple the team). I suppose you could root for that…. but that’s not exactly a fun way to be a fan, you know?
77 - I’m sure he would rather win than lose, no doubt.
But it is not their goal. Their goal is to turn a profit every year.
It’s the every year part that sticks in the craw.
They don’t sit down every year and say “How are we going to win the world series this year! They say “How are we going to keep the team profitable this year?”
Sure, they’d like to win. But that’s not the way they approach their job. They’ve said as much themselves.
Dave, with the Pirates getting Huntington to run their organization about how long until they are competitive? How long does it take to turn a franchise around?
I’m not Dave, but I don’t see the Pirates getting into playoff contention anytime soon because it’s in such poor shape at all levels of the organization. Not only is there no quick fix, there aren’t very many assets that can be dealt as part of a long-term fix.
I like the Huntington hire, but in 20 years when he writes his memoirs, the Pirates chapter will begin with him being incredulous at how bare the cupboard was when he took over.
I am a firm believer.
But couldn’t this be a much stronger argument if it wasn’t based on such a small sample-results based analysis?
A skeptic, or crusty old scout, or cigar-chomping 60-year-old GM could say, hey look at all the old school, unwise-big-spenders who made (or nearly made) the playoffs:
Cubs — Yankees — Philadelphia — LAA — NYM
And look at all your new school, sabr-plus-stats teams who stunk (.500 or worse):
Toronto — Oakland — Dodgers — Minnesota — Kansas City — Atlanta
They’d say it was the experience of the old vets, and the big game performances of guys who’d been through the wars, and being clutch, and getting hot at the right time, and delivering 2-out RBI’s that led to these results, not some new-fangled approach to team construction.
Dave — can you quickly and subjectively rate all teams as falling into either new school camp or old school — and then look at winning % across all teams?
I think the results will end up confirming the current hypothesis, but if it just so happened that in the crap shoot of the playoffs, the Cubs and Phils and Yanks had won, and someone popped off that, see this proves that the new school approach does not work or its time has come and gone, Dave and others would jump all over it to say, whoa….
Dave — can you quickly and subjectively rate all teams as falling into either new school camp or old school — and then look at winning % across all teams?
While you’re at it, could you get me a beer? I don’t want to get up from this comfy armchair.
Also: that list of “sabr-plus-stats” teams contains some teams that are not “sabr-plus-stats”. And omits Tampa.
I’m not being lazy or trying to dump work on people — I just don’t know well enough to say who are the new school versus old school GMs
nor was the list an attempt to be exhaustive
the point of “quickly and subjectively” was not that Dave or anyone should do it right away — but wondering if it could be done by someone who is already familiar with all 30 teams without them investing more than 2 minutes in time or effort
and the original post should have said “sabr-and-scouts” (not sabr-and-stats)
and which teams (of Toronto, Oakland, Dodgers, Minnesota, Kansas City, Atlanta) would you say are not sabr-and-scouts?
83,84:
I think what Dave’s pointing out is that a team (Cleveland) has been able to come up with a pretty solid competitive advantage in the FO and in talent evaluation and have replicated it successfully in other places.
It’s not about stats vs. scouts. It’s about maximizing the information you have to make the crucial decisions correctly as much of the time as possible. And they have been very successful at it.
A good analogy to this would be the Bill Walsh tree in football, which was pretty darn successful.
Stats and Scouts: Cleveland, New York Yankees, Boston, Texas, Arizona, Colorado, San Diego, Milwaukee, Tampa Bay
Stats, not much scouts: Oakland, Toronto (controversially - no one really likes what J.P. is doing up there)
Scouts, not much stats: Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, Minnesota, Chicago x two, Los Angeles x two, Seattle, San Francisco, Cincinatti, Houston, Florida, Washington, Philadelphia, New York Mets, Kansas City
Undergoing change: St. Louis, Pittsburgh
I understand Dave’s point. I agree with it. I’m not saying anything about stats vs scouts.
I am saying that in its narrowest reading, Dave’s point could be criticized for being too small-sample and results-based. New school teams are in the final four — but some old school teams did well also, and some new school teams did not do well.
I believe, if there were a way to categorize all 30 teams as being run by either new school or old school executives (Dave’s point), and then you looked at the winning percentages for all 30 teams, you would find that the new school executive teams outperformed the old school executive teams — and then Dave’s point would be bullet-proof from criticism.
One wouldn’t have to say “darn successful” — we could say “this successful”.
And I am not trying to advocate this as simply some kind of silly academic exercise. I think the core problem is that Lincoln and Armstrong and Bavasi do not believe Dave’s point. They view it as small sample theater and not strong enough to change their fundamental beliefs. They do believe that BB has made progress and that buying another starter or two, or sticking with a veteran run-producer can lead to success — just like the Cubs or Phils or Yanks or Mets. They can dismiss the lessons being taught by the Indians as being anomalous. I think the lesson would be harder for them to discount if we could look at all 30 teams and see (as I suspect we would) that across all of baseball, new school teams win more.
Stats and Scouts: …
perfect — I’ll compile winning %’s
You’d have to adjust for payroll, too, since Boston and New York are both in the first column, and they’ll skew everything. And winning percentage won’t account for how good the Tampa organization is, talent wise, right now.
Re: 74 (gwangung)
We agree more than not, but one could as easily assign blame to a baseball operations side that doesn’t clearly and forcefully explain the limits of how (and how much) the business side can be allowed to interfere with the baseball side as faulting the business side for not recognizing that they are overstepping their bounds. The flip side of a too-strong business side is a too-weak baseball operations side.
In response to John in LA: “I’m sure [Lincoln, Amrstrong, et al.] would rather win than lose, no doubt. But it is not their goal. Their goal is to turn a profit every year.”
You see, John, that is the entirety of their job, though. Don’t get me wrong, I’ve said many of the same kinds of things before, but at the end of the day, it is up to the baseball people to make the case for going over budget to acquire “the last piece” at the deadline, or that the window of opportunity is closing, or that valuing an aging, immobile veteran because he’s “the face of the franchise” will cost both short-terms wins and long-term development of “the future of the franchise,” or whatever. If somebody did that in a competent (and respectful) way, I’m not sure you wouldn’t see this ownership group sacrifice profit for winning.
Maybe the M’s FO (business side) can be faulted for not being receptive to that (maybe in part because of the somewhat flukey success of the 2001 season), but I don’t see anyone on the baseball side doing their part. At least since Lou. And it was Lou’s fate that made me suggest earlier that, rather than just being uninformed by a too-weak baseball side, Lincoln/Armstrong must think they know more than they do about what works. It probably also explains why nobody on the baseball side speaks up much anymore, too.
90 - I think you might understand me a little.
I have no problem with the payroll or the organization’s willingness to spend.
Almost the opposite, actually. My problem is their refusal to start over, to deal with short term loss to accomplish long term goals.
They won’t do a “Cleveland-style” rebuild because they aren’t willing to sacrifice the present. And by spending X they can remain competitive-ish, which is good enough for them.
And I disagree that it is their job to only look at annual profit/loss statements. Someone GOOD at their job would realize sacrificing the short-term for the long-term, when necessary, would be better all the way around.
They don’t get a pass because it’s their job. They are doing it poorly.
Hm. Yes. I think that’s a pretty good explanation. Don’t think we disagree on that at all.
Well, the thing is…ECONOMICALLY speaking, you can justify it. Going to the World Series adds as much as 5-10 percent to your revenue. (And much more than that to the profit line). The principle of adding a missing piece to get to the playoffs and win is fairly well known…even to inexperienced business people.
It’s as you say…the business people hold too much power over the baseball people, and are far too convservative in their risks–and the baseball people not making a strong enough case. Ultimately, that stems from the management philosophy laid down by Armstrong and Lincoln. They may want to win, but they’re just going about it the wrong way (and there’s plenty of case studies in the business world that are similar).
Sorry, got delayed.
So, here’s some crude summary analyses in Winning Percentage:
9 Sabr-plus-Scouts teams: .534
11 S-p-S teams (w/A’s,Jays): .526
17 Old School teams: .489
19 Old School Teams: .485
(w/StL & Pitt)
Exclude A’s, Jays, Yanks, Red Sox to get:
7 lower-budget S-p-S teams: .518
And of course, this does not in any way analyze wins per dollar, nor anything like how good Tampa Bay is on the way to being.
Playoffs?
7/9 (78%) new school teams in playoffs, or nearly so.
4/17 (24%) old school teams in playoffs or nearly so.
or
7/11 (64%)
4/19 (21%)
I think Dave’s point is bullet-proof.
And in terms of wins per dollar, I suspect nuclear bomb proof…
ESPN weighs in today with “Asdrubal Cabrera, 21, has been a key figure in the Indians’ resurgence. ”
Tim Kurkjian just loves him.
91/John: I agree with you about the unwillingness to tear down in order to build a better chance at winning and longer-term profitability down the road. Both you and gwangung have made that point well, I think.
I’m not sure that unwillingness is proof of your “their overriding goal is profitability, even at the expense of winning” (to paraphrase - and pardon me if I misstate or misinterpret you) argument, though. I think Lincoln/Armstrong would say “hey, we’ve got the revenue stream to rebuild without completely tearing down” and, looking at the experience of some other teams with newer stadiums whose novelty might be wearing off, might be justified in fearing what a tear-down would do to that revenue stream and the decad-and-a-half work they put into the marketing of this team to get to where they are. Look at the third graph in Derek’s post below this one if you don’t think it was a reasonable fear - it was happening right before their eyes in Cleveland, who even this year has not recovered to put up the attendance the Mariners did in their worst year during their 3-year losing stretch. Lincoln/Armstrong would probably argue that, if that ultimately proves not to have gotten them back to where they were in 2000-2003, then the fault lies in the execution of the strategy rather than the strategy itself.
I’m not sure where I stand on that - certainly the strategy could have been better executed under the Bavasi regime, but like you I find some fault in the strategy itself (though probably not as much as you seem to). Cleveland will ultimately recover, but would they have if they hadn’t made it to the ALCS (or beyond) this year? If they had missed the playoffs again this year (despite a strong year), or lost in the first round, would attendance recover in future years enough to generate the revenue pay for guys like Sizemore, Carmona, Sabathia, Westbrook, Lee, Hafner, Martinez, Blake, et al.? Even if you think the answer is “yes,” I think you have to acknowledge that it would be far from certain, extremely worrisome, and all based on the fate of a few bounces that can go either way, even for a good team.
There is probably middle ground here, but I’m not going to fault Lincoln and Armstrong too much on this one. Yes, they think they know more about baseball than they probably do, and yes they probably dictate too much of the baseball operations strategy from a purely business point-of-view, but I don’t think anybody has made a compelling alternate case to them. I also don’t think anybody, even here, has made a compelling case that the “anti-Cleveland” strategy of contending while rebuilding couldn’t have worked here if it had been executed well. Bavasi gave away a lot of valuable pieces, and time and again chose to pursue over-priced mid-level talent in greater quantities instead of a “stars and scrubs” model. We floundered in both the free agent and trade markets, for the most part, during Bavasi’s tenure….
OK, on the idea that “Howard Lincoln is all just about maximizing profit!111!!!”- I would argue that that is, as a matter of fact, demonstrably false- or he’s choosing a very, VERY stupid way to go about it.
Observe the following from Forbes.com:
[long link]
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/33/Income_1.html
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/33/07mlb_The-Business-Of-Baseball_Income.html?thisSpeed=10000
Cleveland: around 90 million in operating income, 2004-2006
Seattle: around 40 million in operating income, 2004-2006
The big reason why that is, is because Cleveland paid 136 million in payroll over those 3 years, and Seattle paid 257 million. Yeah, Seattle ALSO had better attendance (and presumably better ancillary revenue, TV revenue and so on)… but only to the tune of about 2 million fans. Basically, each of those additional fans Seattle “bought” by being competitive with the payroll cost them $60 each a head in additional payroll. It looks pretty clear to me they did not GET $60 in additional revenue a head from those fans, which is why their operating income is lower.
I would argue that if Lincoln was about squeezing the Benjamins, he should have blown up the team in 2004, not bothered with bringing in Sexson and Beltre, taken it in the shorts for a couple years and shrunk attendance down to 1.8-2 million while taking payroll down to 40-50 million, cashed in on high draft picks and maybe 30 million a year in operating income, and rebuilt the team around kids. In other words: what Cleveland did after 2001 makes perfect sense from a pure operating profit sense. It’s how cheap owners (*coughCarlPohladcough*) have ALWAYS operated teams- clamp down on payroll, field a replacement-level team + kids who make the MLB minimums or are under your control, and other expenses and pocket the excess revenue you get from operating ANY MLB team (national TV revenue, gate from the Yankees and Red Sox, the people in your market who WILL come and see ANY baseball, even if it’s bad and so on).
Basically, I think we should take Lincoln at his word: he care more about fielding a “competitive” team than about maximizing profit. He and his management team just do a horrible job at it.
I think the big problem for the Mariners’ business guys is that they don’t understand the difference between looking at past results and predicting future results in baseball.
It’s taken me a long time to get my head around it for baseball too, and I do customer analytics for a living. So many of the “results” in baseball like “hitting streaks”, “teams doing well in June”, “Mr. October” are just small datasets of random noise. At best there is a huge variation around long term metrics representing the true talent of a player. To most observers including smart businessmen like Lincoln and Armstrong, results over even a couple of months seem solidly based and the argument that you need to ignore the common metrics like ERA or wins or batting average and look at some less tangible measure to really understand how the player is doing and will do is hard to swallow.
That said, the team isn’t going to change its philosophy and do better until Lincoln and Armstrong change. Beating up on Bavasi isn’t going to fix things, they’d just hire a new Bavasi.
re 96
Exactly.
Besides, why attribute to malice what can easily be traced to incompetence…..?
hey! look what TR Sullivan noticed!
GMs in LCS have a lot of Hart
95- Pete - I think i’m not being clear… I’m not saying they penny pinch, or don’t want to win, or any of that.
I’m saying they are corporate managers who place an arbitrary and counter-productive value on ANNUAL profits and losses. They stay within that framework and it leads to bad baseball decisions… like not going over budget to get someone to put us over the top in a pennant race(even though they’d be happy to spend twice as much in the NEXT budge), or risk a temporary drop in attendance to get better.
This is not unusual corporate behavior… it’s just BAD corporate behavior and you need to have a strong owner, board or CEO who looks past annual statements and sees the bigger picture.
96 - E.C. - It’s not about maximizing profit, that’s not what I said… it’s about having a goal of being profitable “every year”, which mandates, in his mind, spending the magic amount that keeps people in the seats.
This isn’t interpretation, really. He’s said it pretty plainly.
I don’t at all think we have penny-pinching ownership… we have inefficient ownership.
Great article… That is amazing at how young all these guys are… Its because the old ones like Steinbrenner are outta touch with reality. Imagine if they hired me at 24, we would be a dynasty until I got old…er 40.
Depressing. Sad, true and depressing. Even more depressing will be watching Asdrubal Cabrerra through the rest of the playoffs.
WOW — if Peter Gammons is getting it (or at least is plagiarizing Dave), can Lincoln, Armstrong, Bavasi be far behind? Perhaps there is hope…
[long link]
I apologize for this comment not contributing substantially to the discussion, but [deleted, does not contribute substantially to the discussion]
93: results-based? skewed by strength of division given unbalanced schedule? skewed by payroll $. skewed by number of critical injuries encountered by a roster over a given year?
don’t get me wrong; i think it would be a fascinating exploration, but one that would require more than 1 years’ worth of data and perhaps, following a team or two’s transformations from one type of organization into another in order to more accurately isolate what’s really happening before attributing credit. Also, if the organization can be categorized at the major league level, does it also follow that it’s the same approach used in their minor leagues and so, would that have any relationship on number of home-grown prospects etc. Just speculating, and no, no plans to do any real work. (got enough on my plate)
94: I loved Asdrubal Cabrera as well, and thought of him often this season while being tormented by having to watch Oswaldo Navarro instead.
ESPN weighs in today with “Asdrubal Cabrera, 21, has been a key figure in the Indians’ resurgence. ”
Tim Kurkjian just loves him.
Choice quote:
Wow, so can you imagine an infield with both Carols Guillen and Asdrubal Cabrera? How great would that be? But it would be really expensive to acquire players of that caliber — and no team would be lucky enough to grow both of them. Of course, if you did (because, I don’t know, the goose laid the golden egg and puppies and rainbows fell from the sky), you certainly would hang onto at least one of them.
Right?
The Mariners have shown this season that they aren’t paying attention to what people are writing/analyzing about the M’s. Everybody knows the gory details. Personally, I appreciate the continuing excellent writing/analysis that comes through USSM, but we all know it won’t change the M’s management’s mind.
The wider national media (and baseball people behind the scenes) are picking up on the shocking ideas that youth can serve and that information is your friend. Hopefully, Bavasi, Lincoln, Armstrong–even one of their wives–will start reading and listening and connect the dots. I’m afraid that we’ll be here, frustrated, until all the self-evident and stat/scout backed facts become baseball’s new conventional wisdom. And then we’ll still be rebuilding, which is even more expensive when you’re among the last to the hardware store.
It’s not about maximizing profit, that’s not what I said… it’s about having a goal of being profitable “every year”, which mandates, in his mind, spending the magic amount that keeps people in the seats.
Er, so isn’t the best way to be profitable every year to pursue a strategy that maximizes profits? Also, I’d like to point this out if we’re going to go by Lincoln’s public statements that his goal ALWAYS is to run a profit, every year:
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/baseball/193932_lincoln06.html
Q: Speaking of perceptions, you’ve always been a strong advocate of a balanced budget. Why are you willing now to take an operations loss in 2005?
A: There is a perception that we have some kind of static business model that never changes regardless of circumstances. That’s not the case. If we’re going to achieve the objective, there are times when we have to consider taking a loss. It’s not something we look forward to, and we’ve had seasons where we’ve made a profit and maintained a high payroll. Every season is different. We don’t operate with a model that never changes.
I’ll agree with you on INEFFICIENT ownership, though. That’s plainly obvious.
Yes, they want to run a profit. However, they’re willing to spend within reasonable limits- and to be blunt, it’s NOT the money that’s the problem; it never really has been. I can point to umpteen playoff teams the last 5 years who’ve spent less than the M’s in a particular year, and if it was all about the Benjamins, we’d be discussing the umpteenth Yankee World Championship in a row in a few weeks. It’s the organizational mindset that shapes HOW they spend the money that’s the problem. They could easily have the exact same goals as you ascribe (”we’d like to turn a profit every year and get as many regular season wins as we can while doing it, and we’ll let the playoffs take care of themselves”), but if the decision-making process was, oh, based in something other than near complete contempt at the last 20 years of sabremetrics and worship of tired old baseball nostrums (veteran leadership, chemistry, intangibles), we’d be just fine.
I can point to umpteen playoff teams the last 5 years who’ve spent less than the M’s in a particular year, and if it was all about the Benjamins, we’d be discussing the umpteenth Yankee World Championship in a row in a few weeks.
We could be talking about how this is the 13th straight season that the Yankees have made the playoffs, though. Going by runs scored and runs allowed, you can make a pretty good case for the Red Sox and Yankees being the two best teams in baseball this year.
I agree with your point that the Mariners could be doing more with the money that they have, but we shouldn’t marginalize the advantage that a smart team with a large payroll has over a smart team with a low payroll. (Or that a dumb team with a large payroll has over a dumb team with a low payroll.)
108 - “Er, so isn’t the best way to be profitable every year to pursue a strategy that maximizes profits?”
You’d think. But you’re engineering it the right direction. If you go the other way around, it is not.
Why is “year” important? Why isn’t “maximize profits” enough? What do you gain by putting your profit-loss in the confines of one year segments?
It’s a very limiting and inefficient way to run an organization.
“Also, I’d like to point this out if we’re going to go by Lincoln’s public statements that his goal ALWAYS is to run a profit, every year:”
Ah yes, Guess he didn’t like the reaction to his earlier frankness.
Which is a pretty funny itself. The infamous first interview, I believe, was with Forbes. Those are his boys, that’s his environment. It probably never even occurred to him that what he said wouldn’t appeal to those of us who look at baseball as more than a business.
Which is a bigger conversation on whether or not baseball is more than a business?
I say yes. Lincoln would probably say… “I’m sorry, I don’t understand the question. What’s more than a business? Two businesses?”
“and to be blunt, it’s NOT the money that’s the problem;”
Who said it was? It plainly is not. That was never my point.
And yes, they absolutely could be a good team with the bad management styles of L and A… the same you can say that they could still be a good team even with (fill in the blank). But why play with a handicap?
But I think we agree on the ways they mishandled things, and I agree with you that those problems are largely independent of the stuff I’m talking about.
I’ve been wanting to make this post for a while now, and maybe this is the right thread for it.
While I’m a firm believer in the stats approach to building a winning team and share the general frustration shown around here with the Mariners’ general disdain for obvious statistical trends, I also think that there is a disconnect between the way we see the team and the way that the M’s see the team. It all comes down to one word that has already been mentioned in this thread: “Business”
It seems logical that the best way to make money with a baseball team would be to win games, and there’s abundant evidence that a statistical approach to the game can help you win. But I think that the M’s are proving the assumption incorrect. I think that you can make a baseball team a successful business, and even (as generally agreed) more than just a business without taking the statistical approach.
The reason for this, I think, is because the people who pay for tickets are not as influenced by winning as we (the stats-oriented people) are. They’re after that “more than a business” part, that intangible feeling of a good time at the ballpark and they’re able to get that feeling from other aspects than just the win-loss record. A case in point would be Willie Frickin’ Bloomquist and the love-on that the city seems to have with him. Local boy makes good. Great press, and the fans who clamor to have him play will pay to see him. Doesn’t matter if he’s the worst utility player in the league or not, or that the manager uses him in the worst statistical way possible, or that he costs the M’s 5 wins a year. Joe Lunchpail, swayed by the local media, doesn’t know, doesn’t care, and can’t be convinced by mere numbers when he knows that Willie is a good guy who tries hard.
It takes thinking to make sense of the stats (yes, even when they’re as obvious as Sexson’s batting average) and Joe Lunchpail doesn’t have time to think about baseball, he just wants to watch it and have a good time. Grit, hustle, and (gasp!) team chemistry are meaningful quantities to him, things that he understands and can identify with. It’s easier to explain “Willie always tries hard” to his kids than it is to drag them through park-adjusted OPS. Humans are a lazy bunch, and Joe just wants to relax, enjoy the game, and have a nice cold beer (Mmmm…. beeeeer), not tax his neurons with number crunching.
And his ticket money counts just as much as yours and mine. (Well, more than mine, actually, since I’m 1700 miles away, but you get my point.)
While I hate the way the team is being run, I find that I’m forced to grudgingly admit that the FO is not entirely stupid and may in fact be quite good at what they are paid to do, which is to keep the business profitable. Yes, they spend more money than they should and get fewer wins, but every time they bring in an expensive free-agent with a well-known name and a strong probability of underachieving they’re playing to Joe Lunchpail and his buddies and irritating the hell out of those of us who like math and wins. I don’t have access to their marketing data (I used to work for a marketing company but I got better), but I’d suspect that the vast majority of paying customers think Richie will work through his slump and that Willie’s attitude is a huge benefit to the team, and that the M’s are good entertainment.
And there’s the point. The M’s are entertainers. More than a baseball team, the Seattle Mariners are an entertainment business and a fairly successful one so far. Even for those of us who aren’t afraid of math and have some notion of what xFIP is all about, they’re still entertaining to watch, bitch about, and commiserate with each other over. Even for those of us who don’t like the results, as long as we’re talking about them, generating buzz, and buying the occasional Ichiro! jersey or team hat, they have succeeded in entertaining us.
feingarden - You’ve made some good arguments, and this has been a good discussion, but I’m not sure I can go along with everything you’ve said here. While your comments about the average fan, “Joe Lunchpail” may well be true, that doesn’t mean it is true for those who run the team. It isn’t an either/or proposition, and just because a sizeable portion of their market - even a large majority - choose to ignore the more advanced statistical side of the game doesn’t mean the team should or does.
Now, this team does ignore advanced statistical analyses for the most part . . . but I think it does so for reasons other than business. Or at least, to the extent that business is responsible for that, it is because that side of the team is so much stronger than the baseball operations side that the wants and needs of the business side overwhelm those on the baseball side who might want to employ advanced metrics to the detriment of business-side faveorites like Willie, Raul, etc.
Schuerholz is stepping down
Maximizing profits over the long term versus ensuring a profit (however small /large) every year are two different strategies. The latter is for the risk averse. Some would rather see a $1 million every year for 5 years than a $10 Million profit only in year 5.
I cry “FOUL”!
Jerry Crasnick was out of ideas to write about on ESPN so he scavenged USSM for this storyline.
Click: HERE for vultured column.
But they say, imitation is the highest form of flattery, or something like that.
re 114
You know….I don’t think we’re disagreeing much on the broad strokes….only on the very fine details….
And it strikes me that the two strategies described, one is for corporate managers, and the other is for entrepreneurs and VCs.
It’s not a coincidence that the past two Mariner CEOs (Ellis and Lincoln) strike me as more managers than entrepreneurs….
From Jason Stark’s ESPN column today - http://tinyurl.com/2gafy5 - Let’s hope the M’s front office reads this.
“Everything you used to think you knew about October was wrong.
Wrong.
Defunct. Inapplicable. Flat out misguided.
Wrong.
Think about the three fundamental rules of October as we used to know them:
* The team with the most postseason experience usually wins.
* The manager with the most postseason experience usually wins.
* The team with the biggest payroll usually wins.”
Pretty cool stuff.
#115– obviously it’s the story of the moment– there is anopther link to a different take in #99
One of my favorite images of the post-season so far was game 2 in Cleveland, Mark Shapiro in the stands, patiently explaining, one would assume, some finer baseball point to his adorable son. Hire that kid!!
Again: the Seattle Mariners have made less in terms of operating income over the last few years than the Cleveland Indians.
So I think even the propositions that
- they manage the team PRIMARILY with an eye towards annual profit and
- they’re pretty good at this
don’t really hold up. I think it’s reasonable to take Lincoln et. al. at their word: their TWIN goals are competitiveness and profit, and they like to demonstrate the former by making sure the payroll is in the top 10, while not abandoning the latter unless dire circumstances ensue (see: 2004). They just suck at understanding what makes a team truly competitive, and have a bit better idea on how to run a balance sheet.
You have to remember the history current ownership is a successor to: 15 years under mownership that was either undercapitalized and looking towards the door pretty quickly after becoming owners (the Danny Kaye or Jeff Smulyan days) or just plain cheap and out to extract maximum profit for minimal investment in payroll (Argyros), and even during the mid-90’s, salary considerations were part of how the team was run- the Tino+Nellie trade, for instance (which, in retrospect, was a trainwreck- we traded two good players for two ones nowhere near as good- Tino actually compares decently to some guys in the HOF, though he doesn’t belong in there any more than George Kelly does).
Armstrong certainly remembers those days- he’s a holdover from the Argyros years. So I think part of what informs and guides management philsophy is remembering crowds of 7,000 in a cavernous concrete dome, and thus their desire to be “competitive” is quite sincere, from both a business and personal perspective. Baseball isn’t much fun in an empty stadium with a team where you KNOW the ownership is basically giving up on the season in April in order to make sure they get fat checks from MLB’s TV contracts and revenue sharing, and it’s rather sad when you know your boss can’t wait to cash in the good young players in trade for some more kids once they get expensive.
This also might help explain why the M’s keep guys who are “faces of the franchise” around- they had to TRADE Langston, Moore, Hendu, Owen, Cruz, and even Tino- not for talent reasons, but because they couldn’t afford them. I imagine a feeling of “Gee, we can keep guys like Edgar, Wilson, Willie and Raul around now- isn’t that nice?” underlies some things too.
121 - EC, I don’t think you get my point, you keep arguing past it. None of what you are saying addresses the distinction I’m making.
And I agree that the team is generously bankrolled and poorly run.
Excellent post Dave. I am a huge fan of the Indians, especially for their implementation and use of DiamondView. They’ve stepped it up and its proven to work now, I wish the Mariners would develop a similar system. Clearly, one does not need to be a genius to know its the way to go.
By the way, on the subject of the Indians, Antonetti, and Diamondview, this is old but an absolutely excellent read.
http://www.cleveland.com/gameplan/index.ssf?/gameplan/more/part2.html
This if from 2003, but it is why they are where they are now.
You may be able to make a losing team a successful business (as several teams have shown), but I think there’s abundant evidence that that isn’t the strategy the team is following: they’ve spent far more than they needed to the past few years given that they could’ve achieved a losing team with more profits if they hadn’t spent so much on Sexson, Beltre, etc. Simply tearing down and rebuilding with a bunch of kids (which they can market just as effectively as any veteran player) would’ve earned them more profits if winning didn’t factor into it. As I pointed out in a comment in a previous thread Cleveland is spending far less in payroll for each fan who is attending games — and the M’s, who almost certainly have a better cost structure thanks to the stadium and concession contracts, would make more money if they had rebuilt with kids like Cleveland has. And, incidentally, they might still be playing games in October too (sometimes you can have your cake and eat it too).
It’s also not at all clear that the Mariners are going to remain profitable (or as profitable) if they continue with their “not necessarily winning” strategy (if indeed that’s what it is): attendance has gone from #1 in baseball five years ago to #16 in 2007, and that plunge looks to continue. Cleveland plunged further during their rebuilding process, and remains lower, but they’re spending far less… and now they’re winning, too, which is bound to help attendance next year.
No, I’d say the M’s want to win games and the division, and their “lunchpail” fans do too, and when they don’t the fans stay away and the team spends a lot more money, both of which impact their bottom line.