Wouldn’t dream of it, but we’re Mariner fans. Small sample sizes have produced such wonders as Willie Bloomquist, good MLB hitter. You’ve acknowledged it, but the end-of-07 vs. beginning-of-08 thing could be big. The sample size at each single year of age seems like it might be susceptible to swings if a pitcher moves from a 4-seamer to a 2-seamer, or is just looking off like Verlander.
Also, did you correct for innings pitched in a career or season, too. I’d expect Felix’s FB to be down from where it is now when he’s 29, whereas someone like JJ Putz would be stable (or increase).

To be clear, I wasn’t saying that fastball velocity isn’t correlated *at all* with success, but that you can lose velocity and still be improve. That is, that a decrease in velo need not cause a drop in runs prevented or whatever.

Finally, thanks again for the study and for coming over here to discuss it Josh! Keep up the great work.

Unfortunately, my fastball speed curve dropped straight down many, many years ago.

I agree with you Marc this isn’t what I expected to see from the data at all. I was shocked when I saw the results. It is absolutely counterintuitive but that is what the data is saying. It was very counterintuitive when Voros found that pitchers don’t really control BABIP yet now pretty much everyone accepts that. You shouldn’t disregard the results just because they aren’t what you expected.

Also, speed of the fastball absolutely does have an impact on pitcher success. You are right that it is far from the only thing that matters but I am currently studying that too. If you check my last two THT articles you can see what things make up a good curveball and slider.

Be careful about things like this:

“Because we finally have the ability to collect and process data about X, we can now tell you something about X we never knew before….”

Yes, even a small sample size can tell you something, but you can’t be sure it tells you anything *correct*.
To me, the conclusion is flat-out bizarre. It would be quite a thing if it’s eventually corroborated in a 10 year study or whatever.
None of this is meant as a jab at Kalk, who’s done more work with these data than anyone. I’m just not buying it, even as more of a ‘don’t apply to individual pitchers’ sort of a thing.

Saying that Beane is exploiting ‘market inefficiencies’ is a little simple in my opinion. He simply does a better job identifying players that will be successful. In his ’system’ or any other system.

But I do think the bulk of his success was exploiting the market inefficiencies. He didn’t have a markedly different talent evaluation mechanism for, for example, Mulder and Hudson, he just knew they weren’t likely to be worth the money they were going to cost in free agency. He also wasn’t under any misconception that guys like Scott Hatteberg were superior talents, just that they could be made into useful pieces of a team at minimal cost. From a talent standpoint, I’m sure Beane would’ve rather kept Giambi Major at 1B in 2002, but knew that the talent differential between Giambi and Hatteberg was much, much less than the salary differential when Giambi hit free agency.

Also, simply because the players fastball velocity decreases at the age of 29 (small sample size!) does not necessarily mean they are anymore inferior pitchers.

True, especially considering a fastball is not much of a weapon if you don’t have anything to mix in with it (c.f Putz, JJ, circa 2004). FB velocity is just one data point in the evolution of pitchers. Like hitters who compensate for lost bat speed, pitchers can compensate for lost velocity (though like hitters, I suspect certain types of pitchers do better than others, a la my comment about prototype curves above).

Likewise for Beane, just because other GMs catch onto his old tricks doesn’t mean he can’t come up with new ones to compensate. But, like a pitcher losing speed on his FB, Beane will need to refine his approach.

The real test for Billy Beane will be whether he can continue to find value as the rest of the league catches onto and eliminates the market inefficiencies Beane first exploited.

I think we already have examples of this happening. The Haren trade with Arizona is a perfect example where he wasn’t necessarily exploiting market efficiencies (batting average preference vs OBA, pitchers who get outs vs. power pitchers, athletes vs. winners) but simply proper talent evaluation and the willingness to pull the trigger. Arizona’s GM Byrnes is very well respected and he obviously made a trade that will benefit his team this year (and probably the next three) while the A’s made a very profitable trade because they got a lot of high talent players.

Saying that Beane is exploiting ‘market inefficiencies’ is a little simple in my opinion. He simply does a better job identifying players that will be successful. In his ’system’ or any other system.

Also, simply because the players fastball velocity decreases at the age of 29 (small sample size!) does not necessarily mean they are anymore inferior pitchers.

…what’s amazingly cool about this whole thing, that this data set exists, is accessible, and can give us things like this.

And it’s free!

Y’know, combining this article with the Beane interview, I find myself wondering: did he accidentally stumble onto a formula that works out of necessity? In other words, his pitchers are usually gone to other organizations by the time they hit the velocity drop years. So, when he has more money in Fremont and can retain more of his players (as he suggested he would in the interview), will that actually work against him? I had that thought as I was reading the interview, and this article only seems to bolster that idea.

The bulk of Beane’s success hasn’t been one particular theory of talent evaluation or another. It’s really been about identifying and exploiting value – what do other teams undervalue (sign them, they’re a bargain) and what do teams overvalue (trade them, they bring a lot in return). Buy low, sell high. Sure, the buy low part was forced on him by his team’s budget woes, but unlike GMs in other financially strapped markets, he didn’t assume he had to buy low-quality versions of the same things the rich teams bought. FA pitchers have been horribly overvalued by most teams, regardless of aging curves, so it was a natural fit for Beane’s value method.

The real test for Billy Beane will be whether he can continue to find value as the rest of the league catches onto and eliminates the market inefficiencies Beane first exploited.