My Philosophical Problem With The Deal
Not surprisingly, Jack threw water on my theory about the Morrow-League trade, stating outright that these deals were two separate, unrelated moves. I will take his word for it – he’s been honest enough as a GM to have earned that.
So, if we strike down my theory that this deal was an extension of the Lee trade and reject the notion that this is a setup for another, better deal (which I just find very unlikely), then the obvious conclusion is that the Mariners simply do not have much faith that Brandon Morrow will be an effective starting pitcher. This trade is essentially a bet against Morrow’s future value, with the team trading out the best case scenario (he succeeds as a starter) for a better probability at a lesser return.
If you believe that Morrow is a reliever, then preferring League makes a lot of sense. They both do the same thing well – throw really hard – but League does it with a sinker that is more effective than Morrow’s four seam fastball. League is a better reliever than Morrow. If you significantly discount or eliminate the possibility that Morrow will succeed as a starter, then this swap makes sense.
But that’s my problem with this. No one knows how Brandon Morrow is going to develop. He’s basically still a prospect, having been jerked around so many times that his development has been stunted significantly. We can try to make educated guesses about the likelihood of his success in the rotation, based on his pitch types, command, durability, and other assorted assessments. But, in the end, none of us know what is going to happen. He could flame out and never amount to anything. He could win multiple Cy Young Awards. He could end up anywhere in between.
This trade is a specific bet against Morrow’s development. In stock market terms, the M’s are shorting Brandon Morrow. Maybe they have enough information about him to believe that this is a good idea, but it’s a departure from the type of roster building that they’ve been successful with – giving themselves options and flexibility based on an unpredictable future.
Since Zduriencik got hired, the Mariners have made moves that do not require a specific opinion to be justified in order for the move to work. They’ve added players at prices that are relatively low compared to the potential return, so that even if the move doesn’t work, it was a gamble worth taking. They didn’t know that David Aardsma was going to take a step forward, but they put themselves in a position to let him do so without needing him to in order to justify giving up Fabian Williamson. The cost was so low that he could not work out and it wouldn’t hurt them. They gave themselves an opportunity, but a specific outcome was not necessary.
The same is true of almost every transaction the team has made under Zduriencik. Russ Branyan didn’t have to hit 30 home runs to earn his salary. Franklin Gutierrez didn’t have to be a +30 defensive center fielder to be worth giving up J.J. Putz. Cliff Lee doesn’t have to win the Cy Young to be worth a trio of okay prospects.
For this trade to be a good idea, though, Brandon Morrow has to fail as a starting pitcher. If he goes to Toronto and becomes a quality starting pitcher, you lose, no matter how well Brandon League pitches out of the bullpen. This time, the M’s are betting on a specific result to justify the trade.
This is what Bill Bavasi often did. In fact, this move reminds me a bit of the Rafael Soriano-Horacio Ramirez swap. The M’s were going to trade Soriano, come hell or high water, because they didn’t like his make-up and his history of arm problems. They expected his arm to fall off and so they shipped him off for a lesser player, believing that they’d be better off with something than nothing. Of course, League is far, far more talented than Ramirez, and this deal is a lot more justifiable than that debacle was, but the gamble against a talented pitcher is the same. The Mariners needed Soriano to break down for that deal to make sense, and the M’s need Morrow to fail as a starter for this one to make sense.
Betting on a specific outcome is not how this team was built. We cannot know the future, so the best way to build a team is to give yourself as many good options as possible, then react to what actually does happen. Jack has done this exceptionally well, which is why this move is so puzzling. The team has continually made moves where they took guys with question marks and gave them opportunities. This time, they took a guy with question marks and decided that he wasn’t worth an opportunity, selling for a price that essentially values him as a failure.
This move could work out for the M’s. I’m a known skeptic of Morrow’s abilities, and I believe there’s a pretty good chance his combination of health problems, lack of command, and problems getting LH hitters out will eventually land him back in the bullpen. That could certainly happen. That may even be the most likely outcome. But we don’t know that Morrow will fail as a starter, and this trade presupposes that knowledge. It needs that to happen for this deal to not look bad.
And whenever you put yourself in a position where you need a player to either completely succeed (or fail, in this case) in order to justify the acquisition, there’s a good chance that you’re taking on too much risk. In some cases, the reward might be worth the risk, as I think you can argue is the case with the Lee and Bradley deals. In this case, though, the reward is a relief pitcher. A good relief pitcher, but still, a relief pitcher.
That’s not much reward. If the M’s are right, they get a good arm out of the bullpen who struggles to throw strikes. If they’re wrong, they just gave up a young, power arm in a rotation that is not overflowing with young, power arms. Even if they believe they are right, the costs of being wrong are really high. They have to be right. And that makes this a deal that I just can’t be a fan of.
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(by the way, when you get down off the cross, you should read the post about evaluating chemistry that I linked)
Not to nitpick, but Randy’s bb/9 dropped dramatically at 29. I would say record-wise Randy pitched more innings and had more decisions since he mostly started even in the early years, but ERA, ratio W/L, H/9, etc. are not that far from what Morrow was doing back then. The stats would not say that early Randy was better than early Morrow – stats just don’t back that up. But how to project forward??? Lots of pitchers look like Randy’s early years – few look like Randy’s later years. Nevertheless, should it happen……? Why put yourself in that position for a 7th inning reliever?
Of course! Brandon Morrow = Randy Johnson
One of those two things is true.
Also: pretty much every “stat-head tirade” about Bavasi turned out right, while every team-sports chemistry argument fell flat. Sooooo maybe you want to reconsider which arguments you’re picking.
(…skipping….)
Yes. We’re a gang. A craaaaaaazy gang that composes some minute fraction of online baseball discussion, oppressing evvvvveryone else and keeping them from talking about team chemistry, intangibles. Why, it’s terrible how small, unnoticed blogs like this conspire to keep Rick Reilly and his ilk from making tons of money espousing your viewpoints!
Briggstar, come out of the closet. Come on, Briggstar, come out of the closet. Briggstar, come out of the closet. Come out of the closet Briggstar…..
kranepool said –
of course not, any more than
Ed Kranepool=Johnny Bench
To be fair, the quote came from the comments section from discussion on the article linked. While Dave’s piece originally discussed Morrow’s chances in 2008, the discussion diverged into Morrow’s career prospects.
MERRY CHRISTMAS, EVERYBODY!!!
To one of the most intelligent and cogent bunch’a writers and readers I know of online- I’m glad we’re fans of the same team.
May 2010 fulfill all you guys’ dreams and wishes. Not the least of which would be a Mariners World Series….
Beers on me once I finally get to meet some of you in person…
[ot]
To the original author: I agree with you.
You left out mention that the M’s also got a prospect.
I hate it, just hate it, when teams give up on young players. Even if Morrow never becomes a great pitcher, he will be cheap, and so there is value in that alone. Also, he has a much higher ceiling than League. Sometimes, it’s better just to hold on to what you have, and realize that there is no such thing as a perfect baseball team and it’s futility to try to build one.
This trade reminds me of our Q and A with Jack and Tony last year. Jack himself brought up the topic of Morrow’s spring training mishandling(I think he was surprised none of us did, and seemed eager to give his version of events). Jack said rather emphatically that Morrow was put in the pen during ST because they were almost in panic mode at the time regarding the pen. Aardsma hadn’t yet asserted himself yet, Lowe was still struggling and basically everyone else was a big question mark.
It was the same reason Bavasi and Hargrove put Morrow in the pen the first time – panic over bullpen options leaving ST.
I think Jack simply didn’t want to begin next season assuming he’d have a bullpen ready for war in April. And I think GMs feel much better going to war with a weak 4 and 5 starter than they do about a shaky bullpen. Given the choice of a solid 1-3 and solid bullpen, or a solid 1-3 with upside with 4 and 5 but a shaky bullpen, my guess is most GM’s of a team whose goal is to win a World Series will take the former.
And remember, Jack told us rather emphatically that day as well that their goal was to win a World Series.
Merry Christmas, hope Santa brought you all season tickets (or at least good seats to a few choice games) and a copy of The Cheater’s Guide to Baseball.
Well, W-L, ERA, and H/9 are not really quality statistics to compare pitchers on. K/9, BB/9 and FIP are better, since they focus on what the pitcher’s doing, rather than his fielders and run support. Also, I’m not sure Randy Johnson is a good guy to compare most pitchers to, since his height made his development significantly different than 99% of everyone else. With that kind of wingspan, control comes pretty slowly. Randy Johnson didn’t make it to the bigs until he was 24, and that year only pitched in 4 games (all starts, 1 CG, 26 IP). Really his 25 year old year was his first full season, while Morrow got started three years younger.
Plus, Johnson rarely did anything but start even his first few years, while Morrow has pitched 60% of his innings as a reliever so far. As Dave pointed out earlier in the thread, pitching from the bullpen improves results. Raw Randy had better stuff than Raw Brandon (compare FIPs and BB/9). So, Morrow can still develop into a quality starter, but he’s almost certainly not going to be in Randy Johnson’s class. His stats through age 24 compare more with someone like Jim Hannan (an average-minus starter who had a couple of good years but never even got close to 200 IP in any season), or Terry Adams (decent reliever who could swing into the rotation on occasion) or guys like Danys Baez and Bill Caudill, good relievers who never started a game after their early 20’s. Those guys aren’t his upside, they’re more like his median projection, and certainly not awful projections. But really, if he turns into Randy Johnson, lots of people will offer to eat their hats.
As far as “giving up too early”, non-Arb years are way more valuable than arb years, and Morrow is about out of his, so he’ll be cheap, but not cheap–cheap. Compare arb and non-arb eligible players by WAR (wins are worth about $4.5M/win on the FA market, Arb-eligible players seem to make about $2M/win, non-arb players make $0.5M regardless. Someone feel free to correct me if I’m wrong on any of these numbers):
WAR / FA value / non-arb Salary : Value / arb-elig salary : value
0.5 / $2.25M / $0.5M : $1.75M / $1.0M : $1.25M
1.0 / $4.5M / $0.5M : $4.0M / $2.0M : $2.5M
1.5 / $6.75M / $0.5M : $6.25M / $3.0M : $3.75M
2.0 / $9.0M / $0.5M : 8.5M / $4.0M : $5.0M
2.5 / $11.25 / $0.5M : $10.75M / $5M : $6.25M
3.0 / $13.5M / $0.5M : $13.0M / $6.0M : $7.5M
Look at it this way. Set aside Brandon League for the moment and consider Yo Hermin alone. Suppose he’s a 0.5 WAR player for his non-arb years and a 1.0 WAR player for his arb years. He’d be a net $12.75 M asset while under club control. If Morrow is a league average starter for his three non-Arb years, he’ll be a net $15M asset. Not saying Chavez will be that – he’s a long way away, but his clock hasn’t started. Morrow’s is half-done, and he’s averaged less than 0.5 WAR per season (and most of that as a reliever).
I think you hit the nail on the head, Rick M. Whatever else you can say about him, Morrow’s ratio of management time to WAR was pretty high. Unless one thinks he will turn out to be the next Randy Johnson (and the trade indicates Zduriencik doesn’t), it’s not a totally unreasonable position to think that having someone you can rely on to fill a particular role on the roster from day one is an advantage if you’re moving all in for the 2010 season, rather than someone whose role seems to morph a couple of times every season. I’m not using that as a justification of the deal, but as an explanation, I think it fits the facts pretty well.
This was a quote from an old post by Dave. I think it’s fair to say Dave isn’t Morrow’s biggest fan, yet, he still thinks it was a lopsided trade.
As for the “odds”, I think this comparison is a little better. BTW, Morrow makes this list if you use his career numbers or only his numbers as a starter. So, yeah, I do like those odds.
To that I can only say… how much has Brandon Morrow improved as a pitcher since that post was written?
What’s really your point?
Are we not discussing the post?
Dave’s having misgivings about trading a man whose flaws as a developing pitcher and longshot odds to self-actualize as a quality SP he made clear a long time ago.
I can understand the emotional reasons for fans to have those misgivings, but there are plenty of reasons why Morrow’s chances of becoming a good enough starting pitcher to make this deal look bad in hindsight are dim at best.
This all comes down to your belief in League v. Morrow. I think Z has a pretty good baseball mind, and if he thinks League provides something more for this club I’ll believe him. Also, getting another prospect to stock in the farm system, especially a potential power outfielder, is nice incentive after giving up prospects in the Lee trade.
There’s likely a lot to this trade we’ll never appreciate. Maybe Z thinks Morrow is too freaked to succeed here, maybe there’s a chemistry issue, maybe Morrow is unhappy, maybe Z thinks Morrow’s potential isn’t really there and he’s dealing before other GM’s figure it out. Too many maybes.
We simply do not know. We can only guess. As it is, I think this trade looks okay on paper, but paper isn’t the end all be all of the game.
I don’t know if this is accurate, for a few reasons.
Your 0.5 WAR historical for Morrow is potential misleading, because: (1) up to now, Morrow has been a reliever; relievers are generally less valuable than starters, (2) I said “I don’t like it when clubs give up on players” – meaning clubs that trade young players before giving them a chance to mature. A mature Morrow would not be a reliever; he would be a starter. Even a league average starter at less than $5M per year is quite valuable these days I would guess.
My point, I guess, was why trade a #5 overall pick with great stuff for a reliever? Sure, League is a great reliever, but he is a reliever nonetheless. Not that he’s not a valuable piece, but there may have been more creative (and less potentially costly) ways to add bullpen depth?
The other thing is, do you think, had Z drafted Morrow, Z would be so quick to get rid of him? No, I don’t think so – Z would’ve been much more likely to keep him. But because another GM drafted him, I think he was quicker to ship him off.
I just wanted to add, because I didn’t really see the sentence where you said,
…for his nonarb years? What about his arb years? Those are still likely to be good deals for the M’s; as long as he’s not a FA.
Again if this was part of the Cliff Lee deal, or part of another deal to get some hard to get piece like a SP or a great hitter, OK, but for a reliever, I just am not sure if it works.